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Resurgence of social scientists' concern with household demand 
has created intradisciplinary disputes within economics over the exact 
interaction of the economic determinants of marriage, labor force 
participation, and fertility. Also interdisciplinary arguments have 
arisen among social scientists over each discipline's contribution to 
the explanation of these phenomena. To test the validity of opposing 
views, a theoretical model of household utility maximization is devel­
oped initially and then tested empirically using a novel data base and 
several estimation procedures.
In Chapter II a mathematical model of household demand is 
developed to test two propositions: I) are individual household member
utility functions independent? and 2) are average wage rates an accu­
rate proxy for time value in general and nonworking mothers in specific? 
In Chapter III, five equations— marriage discriminant, assertive mating, 
labor force discriminant, hours worked, and fertility— are estimated by 
ordinary least squares using detailed microeconomic data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey. In addition, these estimations are re­
ferred to as the traditional model because traditional wage rate time 
valuation and analysis of covariance measures of racial differences are 
used along with the traditional ordinary least squares estimation
procedures.
In Chapter IV the elements comprising the traditional model are 
dropped in favor of a general time valuation procedure, Tobit and Twin 
Linear Probability estimation procedures, and separate samples for 
blacks and whites. In general the results of Chapters III and IV make 
the following tentative observations: 1) average wage rates are an
inadequate proxy for general time value, 2) racial differences in house­
hold demand cannot be accurately measured by analysis of covariance esti­
mation procedures, 3) ordinary least squares are generally inferior to 
the Tobit and Twin Linear Probability estimation procedures, 4) contrary 
to Willis's and the new household demand school of thought's belief, 
individual family member utility functions are not independent, and most 
importantly, 5) competing views within economics and other social scien­
tists contributions reinforce each other when all are included simulta­
neously as household demand determinants.
In summary, this research finds that consideration of sociologi­
cal and psychological demand determinants along with the traditional eco­
nomic factor enhances the explanatory ability of all these measures. 
Specifically, each of the social science disciplines appears to comple­
ment the explanatory variables obtained from the other disciplines.
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CHAPTER I 
HOUSEHOLD DEMAND: AN OVERVIEW
I. Introduction
From the inception of Becker's seminal article which demonstrates 
that the total cost of a product should include the opportunity cost of 
consuming the good, as well as the nominal purchase price, economists 
have applied the time cost concept to studies on fertility, education, 
housing, housing location, commuting patterns, marriage, divorce, and 
labor participation.^ The early evidence from these studies indicates 
that opportunity cost theory increases our understanding of household 
demand formation. At the same time, criticisms concerning this theory 
have been raised from both economic and non-economic sources. Within 
economics, the basic objection questions time value's importance as a 
factor in household demand determination. Also, the question is whether 
time value is a measurable, and therefore useful, concept. A more fun­
damental challenge to this line of economic thought originates from both 
non-economists and economists alike. In their view opportunity cost 
theory ignores the fundamental "truth" that attitudes are a major, if 
not the primary, household demand determinant; therefore, economic 
analysis should focus its attention upon attitude formation.
^Gary Becker, "A theory of the Allocation of Time," Economic 
Journal, 75 (September 1965):493-517.
2In the initial section of this study a theoretical framework which can 
be used as a basis for measuring the magnitude of these problems is devel­
oped. A theoretical life-cycle demand maximization model for just the 
wife is formulated initially to test each position's respective merits. 
After the necessary and sufficient conditions for utility independence 
are derived, detailed microeconomic and attitudinal information are taken 
from the 1967 National Longitudinal Survey to shed some light on the con­
tending theories disagreement. Specific attention is given to disagree­
ments over the proper time value measure and its endogeneity, the relative 
importance of sociological-psychological versus economic demand determi­
nants, and racially imposed differential response patterns for household 
demand.
To promote a better understanding of these problems, the major 
goals and criticisms of existing research are reviewed in the following 
section. In each case detailed mathematical and statistical reviews are 
delayed until the discussion reaches the respective chapters.
II. Survey of the Literature
The following section contains a fairly extensive survey of past 
research dealing with the indirect pricing concept's impact upon house­
hold demand theory. As some studies using a general equilibrium approach 
2
have shown, a significant interrelationship exists between elements of
^R. Willis, "A New Approach to the Economic Theory of Fertility 
Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, 81 (March/April 1973):14-69; 
Paul Gregory, John Campbell, and Ben Cheng, "A Simultaneous Equation 
Model of Birth Rates in the United States," Review of Economics and Sta­
tistics , 57 (November 1972):57-64; Dennis De Tray, "Child Quality and 
the Demand for Children," Journal of Political Economy, 81 (March/April 
1973):70-95; Yoram Ben-Porath, "Economic Analysis of Fertility in 
Israel," Journal of Political Economy, 79 (August 1969):390-401.
3choice in the household decision-making process. Although this survey 
initially subsumes these studies into a partial equilibrium approach, 
the results of the general equilibrium approach are brought forth latet.
A. Fertility Survey
Application of economic analysis to the study of fertility pat­
terns was popularized by Becker's demonstration that fertility behavior 
can be studied under the general theory of utility maximization when 
children are treated in a manner analogous to other consumer durables, 
and that the primary elements of fertility behavior are amenable to
3
empirical testing. Despite the outpouring of theoretical and empiri­
cal research to support or disprove individual facets of Becker's sem­
inal article, utility maximization within the confines of time theory 
analysis continues to form the foundation for empirical studies of fer­
tility patterns. The first fertility studies applied single equation 
regression analysis or analysis of variance procedures to aggregate cross-
sectional and time series data to test the sign and significance of the
4 5
income effect and the influence of the business cycle. Later more
sophisticated procedures were used to measure the interaction of costs.
^Gary S. Becker, "An Economic Analysis of Fertility," in Demo­
graphic and Economic Change in Developed Countries, National Bureau 
Conference Series 11 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).
^Irma Adelman, "An Econometric Analysis of Population Growth," 
American Economic Review, 53 (June 1963):314-39 ; and R. Weintraub, "The 
Birth Rate and Economic Development, An Empirical Study," Econometrica, 
40 (October 1962):36-42.
^Richard A. Easterlin, Population, Labor Force, and Long Swings 
in Economic Growth: The American Experience, General Series 56 (New
York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1968).
income, and education by using simultaneous equation model specifications 
and detailed microeconomic data.^ The current thrust of fertility re­
search deals with four unanswered issues. These are: 1) what are the
appropriate costs of children? 2) what is the relevant income concept?
3) how can quality and quantity expenditures be separated? and 4) how 
important are sociological and psychological fertility determinants rela­
tive to their economic counterparts? These issues are discussed in order.
Child care costs are measured as either the market wage fore­
gone in bearing and rearing children by the woman,^ or the amount of time
g
lost from labor force participation. The time cost proxy is criticized 
by Mincer as being the inverse of fertility because both are thought to
9
be determined by the same economic variables, and by Gregory as ignoring 
the variability in the value of time devoted to children of different 
ages.^^ The wage rate child cost measure is likewise criticized by
^T. Paul Schultz, "An Economic Model of Family Planning and 
Fertility," Journal of Political Economy, 77 (March/April 1969):153-80; 
Y. Ben Porath, op. cit., p. 390; Jacob Mincer, "Labor Force Participa­
tion of Married Women," in Aspects of Labor Economics, ed. Gregg Lewis 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); R. Willis, op. cit.,
p. 22; Glen G. Cain, Married Women in the Labor Force (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1966); and Paul Gregory, John Campbell, and Ben Cheng,
"A Cost Inclusive Simultaneous Equation Model of Birth Rates," Econome­
trica. 63 (July 1972):36-44.
^J. Mincer, op cit., pp. 44-46; R. Willis, op. cit., pp. 33-34;
and Y. Ben Porath, op. cit., pp. 390-401.
®T. P. Schultz, op. cit., pp. 153-80; P. Gregory, et al., op. 
cit., pp. 29; and J. Campbell and D. Conger, "Population Dynamics," 
paper presented at the 1974 meetings of the Western Economics Associa­
tion, Las Vegas, June 1974, pp. 18-19.
9
J. Mincer, op. cit., p. 48.
lOpaul Gregory, "A Stock Adjustment Model of Fertility: The
White and Non-White U.S. Population (1946-1970)," University of Houston, 
Houston, June 1973. (Mimeographed.)
5Gregory because it assumes market goods and services have zero substi­
tutability. Both time value measures are also circumspect as a result 
of Gronau's demonstration that market wages understate the true oppor­
tunity cost of time for non-working women. Because market wages fail to 
attract some women into the labor force, Gronau concludes that a more 
appropriate time value measure of non-working women's time is their 
"reservation wage."^^
The theoretical basis for the alternative child cost measure 
stems from one group’s belief that this cost can be analyzed as the
trade-off between the number of children and time devoted to various 
12
activities. Conversely, the alternative proposition asserts that the
value of marginal commodity inputs better represents the fertility cost 
13
of children. The latter position restates Duesenberry's criticisms 
of Becker's original work in arguing that the trade-off between children 
and time is unimportant because parents cannot separate their standard 
of living from those of the children living at home. The absence of
llR. Gronau, "The Effect of Children on Housewife's Value of 
Time," Journal or Political Economy, 81 (March/April 1973):168-99; and 
Reuben Gronau, "The Intra-Family Allocation of Time: The Value of the
Housewife's Time," American Economic Review, 63 (September 1973):633-51.
12T. Espenshade, "The Cost of Children in the Urban United 
States" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton, 1972); R. Michael and P. Lazear, 
"On the Shadow Price of Children," Econometric Abstracts (February 1972), 
p. 57; and C. Hill and F. Stafford, "Allocation of Time to Preschool 
Children and Educational Opportunity," Econometric Abstracts (February 
1972), p. 58.
James Duesenberry, Comment on "An Economic Analysis of Fer­
tility," by Gary Becker, in Demographic and Economic Change in Developed 
Countries, National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Series 11 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); and P. Gregory, op. cit.,
p. 39.
6consistent empirical support for either position keeps the issue of 
child costs open.
Equally as important in fertility, as well as general demand, is 
the proper measurement of income. Two alternative measures related to 
current income have been proposed. First, fertility decisions may be 
made upon a basis of expected long-run earning c a p a c i t y . T h u s  a per­
manent income concept free from cyclical and transitory effects is pre­
sumed to be a better measure of the families long-run human and financial 
wealth. Although Schultz argues that cross-sectional income differences 
may be a proxy for permanent income, no a priori reason exists to expect 
the transitory income component to "wash out" over the l o n g - r u n . A  
variation from the expectation approach follows Becker's argument that 
family expenditure and fertility patterns reflect the result of its work- 
leisure decision by valuing home activity at the market wage rate in such 
a way as to create a potential earnings stream of money, or full income 
in Becker's terminology. Empirically, potential income is defined as the 
sum of wage income, assuming both spouses are employed full time at their 
opportunity cost wage, plus non-wage i n c o m e . T h o u g h  the full income 
concept may be able to fill the void in our knowledge of the exact rela­
tionship between income and fertility, empirical applications of the full 
income measure have not yet verified this premise.
l^T. P. Schultz, op. cit., pp. 153-80; P. Gregory, et al., 
op. cit., pp. 57-64; G. Gain, op. cit., pp. 141-44; and M. Friedman,
A Theory of the Consumption Function (Princeton; Princeton University 
Press, 1957).
l^T. P. Schultz, op. cit., pp. 153-80.
l^G. Becker, op. cit., pp. 2-5; R. Willis, op. cit., pp. 14-69; 
and P. Gregory, op. cit., pp. 2-6.
7The third issue in the economic literature concerns itself with 
the debate between child quantity and quality, and the significance of 
the division for economic analysis of fertility. Proponents of the sep­
aration between the two expenditures divide child expenditures into 
costs associated with raising and producing a child of a given quality 
and those costs incurred to raise the quality of a given child. Sepa­
ration of expenditures into quality and quantity components produces 
dual effects upon traditional fertility theory: first, the usually
positive, significant income elasticity of demand with respect to quan­
tity may become insignificant or negative; and second, any increase in 
the commodity bundle may represent a rise in only quality expenditures, 
and not direct costs.
Opponents of the quality school of thought counter with the argu­
ment that rising real expenditures may only signify a rising cost of 
children as the family adjusts expenditure patterns to higher standards 
of living, and not discretionary quality expenditures. This approach, 
first suggested by Duesenberry and later quantified by Gregory, suggests 
evaluating child costs on a marginal expenditure per child basis on the
grounds that child quality is a by-product of family quality and there-
18
fore not subject to discretionary decision-making.
Failure to resolve the aforementioned issues in intradisciplin­
ary economic debate by economists has overshadowed the interdisciplinary 
disagreement over the relative importance of sociological, psychological.
Willis, op. cit., pp. 14-69; and G. Becker, op. cit.,
pp. 279-88.
Duesenberry, op. cit.; and P. Gregory, op. cit., p. 39.
8and economic fertility determinants. Characteristic of one criticism
of new household demand theory is Ryder's statement that Willis "studies
19the economics of household decision-making by destroying the family."
On the same vein Jacobsen believes that economists have provided an
empirically verifiable, but basically sterile, body of knowledge by
ignoring the fundamental factors that motivate human behavior in order
20
to appeal to other quantitative scientists. In essence, some econo­
mists doubt that time costs application to fertility is anything more 
than "academic rubbish."
The combined scope of these four disputed areas cover the entire 
spectrum of fertility demand analysis; the choice and measurement of 
cost and income, the appropriate dependent variable, and even whether the 
entire line of research is useful.
B. Marriage Survey
Economic concern with the decision to form multi-member house­
holds and the manner in which assortive mating occurs is an outgrowth 
of the realization that fertility, secondary labor force participation, 
and other forms of household demand do not become operative until an 
individual decides to marry. Examples of how marriage acts as one ini­
tial assumption in economic analysis can be seen in the definition of 
an unmarried woman as being in the primary labor force until she enters 
into such a union or studying fertility demand only within the framework
Ryder, "A Comment," Journal of Political Economy (March/ 
April 1973), pp. 68-71.
20paul Jacobsen, ed.. An Anthology of Society (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1970).
9of married women. Since the majority of children are born to married 
women with husbands present, determining the individual's motives for 
marriage should be the first step in explaining subsequent fertility 
and labor force decisions. In spite of marriagefe pivotal position in 
explaining household demand, economists have only recently begun to 
apply the tools of their discipline to study marriage determinants.
The complete literature on mating and its determinants consists
21
of the initial article by Gronau and the work of Freiden and Becker.
Each study operates on the assumption that marriage, being mostly volun­
tary, contributes positively to the individual's level of utility, and 
can be analyzed according to the tenets of economic theories of prefer­
ence. Secondly, a marriage market is assumed to exist where each indi­
vidual attempts to select the best mate contingent upon their resource 
limitations and conditions in the market.
The essence of the economic argument for marriage involves cal­
culation of the gains and losses from alternative marital statuses. 
According to Becker, a single individual will join with another person 
when the full income of the newly formed household is greater than the 
sum of the individuals' full incomes— full income being defined as nom­
inal income plus the value of each member's time plus the gains in time 
value from specialization of husband and wife into those activities in 
which their marginal productivity is the greatest. This gain in real­
ized full income is attributed to the substitutability of activities.
ZlAlan Freiden, "A Model of Marriage and Fertility" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Chicago, 1972); G. Becker, "A Theory of 
Marriage," Journal of Political Economy, 83 (October 1973):l-36.
10
such as cleaning house, caring for children, household repair, and 
income provision between the household members. The actual magnitude 
of the gains from marriage are associated with economies of scale, and 
are seen to depend upon the elasticity of substitution between market 
goods and time inputs as well as the relative efficiency of each house­
hold member in the production of household commodities.
Of special importance to the study of marriage is the point made 
originally by Freiden and later by Becker that the economies of scale 
argument in itself does not justify marriage in that two or more males 
or females can combine to form a household to capture these benefits.
For instance, in cleaning house, earning a living, mowing the lawn, and 
taking care of the children, men and women are highly substitutable. 
However, in areas such as fertility, husband and wife become perfect 
complements. To Becker, it is this situation which distinguishes the 
single gender from the husband-wife household.
Past fertility and secondary labor force research has, with a 
few exceptions, failed to consider marriage's impact upon these demand 
schedules. Instead, marriage theory— relieved of its role as a tool for 
weeding out undesirable observations in empirical studies— should in-
22
crease our understanding of the individual demand schedule determinants.
C . Female Labor Supply
The literature on the response of the secondary labor force to 
changing market conditions has become voluminous. This volume necessi­
tates that the review be limited to only those studies dealing with the
ZZpcr an exception, see John Campbell and Darius Conger, "Popu­
lation Dynamics," paper presented at the 1974 meetings of the Western 
Economics Association, Las Vegas, June 1974.
11
indirect pricing concept. However, all studies follow two basic ap­
proaches to the study of labor force participation. The first— identl-
23
fied with Telia and Dernburg-Strand — argues that the labor force 
participation rate varies inversely with the unemployment rate, and is 
referred to as the "discouraged worker" hypothesis. Objecting to the 
omission of the possibility of a work-leisure trade-off and the assump­
tion of a completely inelastic labor supply curve, Mincer uses neoclas­
sical analysis to show that potential labor force entrants respond to 
job opportunities and not the wage rate attached to the job. This the­
ory is labelled the "additional worker" hypothesis.
Further research in this area follows either a macroeconomic or 
microeconomic approach. In the macro approach theories applied to aggre­
gate consumption are modified to explain labor force participation.
Among the adaptations are relative versus permanent wages by Wachter 
(from the Duesenberry versus Friedman conception of consumption), money 
illusion or inflation by Wachter (from monetary theorists in general, 
and Friedman in specific), and family assets or wealth by Barzel- 
McDonald (from a variety of sources). In each case neither the dis­
couraged worker nor the additional worker approach adequately explains 
women's labor force participation.
The micro approach builds on the theoretical foundations laid by 
Mincer with the tools developed in Becker's theory of time. According 
to this view women enter the labor force when their marginal productivity
Z^A. Telia, "The Relation of Labor Force to Employment," Indus­
trial and Labor Relations Review, 19 (April 1964);454-59 ; and I. Dernburg 
and K. Strand, "Hidden Unemployment 1953-1962: A Quantitative Analysis
by Age and Sex," American Economic Review, 56 (March 1966):71-95.
12
at work exceeds their home productivity and leave the labor force when 
this condition is reversed. The unsettled issue at this time is caused 
by the uncertainty over how homemakers value their time.
The first time proxy adopted was total family size (a stock con­
cept), followed by the flow of children, and then the stock of pre-school 
children in the family. In the flow variable, ignoring the presence of 
other children obviously understates the mother's time contribution in 
the home. Similarly, the total child stock measure also understates time 
value because it assumes the value of a mother's time inputs per child 
are constant regardless of age of children and number of children.
In short, the burden children place on a potential working mother 
is their impact on her value of time. Though a child under one year re­
quires more marginal time from the mother than more self-reliant older 
children, the flow of children proxy by itself understates her total 
value of time. Conversely, error attributed to total family size depends 
on the number and age distribution of the children. For instance, a 
family composed of teenage children will demand different amounts of 
their mother's time than one with the same number of pre-school children. 
In the former situation the aggregate family size variables values the 
mother's time equally with the young children family. Regardless of the 
actual magnitude and direction of error, no a priori reason exists to 
accept equal time value in this example. Assuming that the peak time 
costs of children occur in the early stages of growth and decline there­
after, Gregory uses the number of pre-school children in the household. 
Theoretical and empirical support for Gregory's position can be found in
13
Gronau's demonstration that the value of a mother’s time decreases with 
the age of children and increases with their number.
Another problem plaguing labor force participation research is
proper sample selection and definition of family income. The samples
concentrate upon married women on the grounds that unmarried women are
either supported by their parents, or, are forced to participate in the 
24
work force. In actuality, the decision to enter the labor force is 
closely tied to three possible decisions regarding participation in the 
marriage market: 1) to enter the labor force and not the marriage mar­
ket, or 2) to enter just the marriage market and depend upon external 
forces for support, or 3) to enter both markets simultaneously. If 
either choice 2 or 3 is followed and a marriage occurs, the female is 
again faced with three alternatives: 1) participate in the labor force,
or 2) concentrate on the production of household goods, or 3) perform 
each activity on a part-time basis.
Section II, part B, on marriage explained that the decision to 
marry is based on a shift in the production possibilities of the part­
ners, and that the eventual choice of partner determines the magnitude 
of the production possibilities curve shift. This actual change in pro­
duction possibilities is the primary determinant of the housewife's 
time, which in turn is taken as the major factor affecting the labor 
force activity of married women. If this reasoning is valid, concen­
trating on samples of married women to the exclusion of the reasons for
24^$ always, exceptions to the general model exist, such as 
divorcees and widows. Though these cases are small relative to the 
total secondary labor force supply, and therefore minimizes subsequent 
biasses in conclusions based on samples of married women, the rising 
absolute number of these situations deserves further attention.
14
forming the household and the resultant characteristics of the household 
ignores, perhaps, the most important explanation of labor force partici­
pation. Further, this may be the most important determinant of labor 
activity by married women.
Corollary to this same problem is the use of family full income 
and family assets, i.e., non-human wealth, for exactly the same reason. 
The process involved in the decision to marry and the characteristics 
of the eventual spouse explains a considerable portion of full income 
and non-human wealth. Thus, the decision to enter or leave the labor 
force depends partially upon the decision to marry and choice of spouse. 
Once again, exclusion of the marriage decision from labor force analysis 
subsumes an important labor force determinant into a criteria for sample 
selection.
As in the fertility and marriage surveys, the secondary labor 
force literature began with pure economic variables, added measures of 
family responsibility, and then proceeded to recognize the possibility 
of causal relationships. These causal relationships include time value 
and child costs, the reverse effect impact of child costs upon time, and 
the simultaneous relationship between fertility and both time and child 
costs.
The single theme underlying the first three surveys is the posi­
tive price for deriving household full income and costs. Section ii, 
part D, looks at time theory apart from these applications.
D. Theory of Time
Since Becker's formal introduction of the theory of time into
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economic analysis, authors have expended great effort in applying the
concept to the household decision-making process. As is the situation
with a new theory, imperfections existed and were corrected as they
came to the attention of the profession. The initial weakness detected
in the theory of time was its failure to discuss in detail the impor-
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tance of substitution effect and the source of this effect. Later, 
the needlessly strong assumption of zero substitutability between mar­
ket goods and time is relaxed through the introduction of a time consump­
tion constraint by DeSerpa. A time consumption constraint differs from 
the time resource constraint in that the resource constraint refers to 
the physical amount of time available for use in a day, while the con­
sumption constraint puts a lower bound on the amount of time needed to 
produce a home good. Examples of binding constraints on time consump­
tion are a round of golf, meals, speed limits, reading a book, etc. in 
which the form of constraint may be physical, such as reading ability, 
or institutional, such as speed limits. In either case, time and mar­
ket goods become substitutes of varying degrees depending upon the 
nature of the good and the minimum amount of time required to consume it.
An alternative technique for incorporating a substitution effect 
is to assume that hours of work are flexible rather than fixed. Once 
the amount of work is allowed to vary, changes in the price of time—  
taken as the wage rate or any other measure— produces three effects:
1) a compensated cross-price effect, 2) an own price effect, and 3) a
25gecker does discuss the implications for his model from drop­
ping the assumption of fixed factor proportions upon his preceding 
analysis in a normative manner, but passes over these implications for 
his numerical solutions.
16
26
Slutsky income effect. An urban commuting study by Mankin illustrates
that the absence of cross-price effects in household demand models will
produce significantly different conclusions from those models where fac-
27
tor inputs can be substituted. The relevant part of this lesson to 
family decision-making studies is the importance of allowing the house­
hold to substitute time for market goods in the household production 
function in both the conceptual and empirical models.
A second weakness observed in Becker’s original work involves 
the proper time cost measure. Becker, and everyone else except Gronau, 
adopts the average wage rate as the appropriate variable for conversion. 
To justify the wage rate time valuation approach for housewives, its 
advocates typically provide the following rationale. Accordingly, if 
one believes that housewives and female laborers with similar socioeco­
nomic characteristics have equal time values, the housewife's value of 
time can be imputed from women's market wage rates. When a woman's 
labor supply is the mirror image of her derived demand for time at home, 
then her price of time corresponds to her "entry wage"— the wage at 
which she is ready to supply the first unit of labor. By estimating 
women's labor supply schedule, one can derive the homemaker's value of 
time by calculating the entry wage. To estimate the impact of income or 
children on time value, one only has to observe supply function shifts 
as these factors affect the "entry wage."
For a formal discussion of this theory, see Mankin-Campbell, 
and Mankin for an application to urban commuting.
Mankin, "A New Look at the Muth Model," American Economic 
Review, 77 (September 1973):470-7A.
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Gronau evaluates this approach by saying, "This method, so allur­
ing in simplicity runs into overwhelming difficulties." These difficul­
ties are identified as finding the true dimensions of labor supply: 
weekly hours, weeks worked, annual hours, and so on, and the proper 
mathematical function to describe the labor supply function. The prob­
lem is that time value estimates are sensitive to both the nature of the 
dependent variable and choice of the functional form. Also, the under­
lying assumption that working women and non-working women with similar 
characteristics are not fundamentally different is tenuous. Their vari­
ous reactions to labor force stimuli indicates that there are some un­
observed, or perhaps misunderstood, fundamental differences between the 
two groups, and these differences may be related to the price women 
assign to their time.
The extension of time value theory by Gronau and Ben-Porath to 
admit the existence of time preferences is a positive addition to our 
stock of knowledge. However, Hall observes correctly that, "a better 
way to account for variations in preferences would be to consider that 
the size of family and the labor force participation of wife are jointly 
determined." This comment by Hall merely underscores the results of the 
previous literature surveys, and supports a modification of Gronau*s 
revisions to include the possibility of simultaneous determination.
E. Partial Versus General Equilibrium Approaches
The predominant stress of past theoretical and empirical research 
has been on the partial equilibrium approach. Thus the fertility
18
decision is viewed in the context of a single fertility equation. In 
this manner, the interaction of fertility and labor market decision­
making is ignored along with other interactions. Thus the partial single
equation approach tends to create specification error and estimation bias
28
— a point made aptly by Okun. Exceptions to this general trend are 
Willis largely at the theoretical level, Gregory, et al., Gregory, 
Campbell-Conger, and Campbell at the empirical level, and to some extent 
Ben-Porath, who works implicitly with the reduced form model. In this 
regard it should be noted that the literature on female labor force par­
ticipation has long noted the impact of fertility in terms of family size 
upon labor participation rates but has failed to complete the circle and 
investigate the reverse impact of the labor market upon fertility deci­
sions— something done to some extent in Gregory, et al., Gregory, Campbell- 
Conger, and Campbell.
III. Method of Approach
The task of incorporating all of the advances in the theory of 
household demand takes place in two stages. The first stage develops a 
general conceptual framework from which inferences about these inter­
relationships can be made. Next, the implications and validity of this 
paradigm are tested empirically.
A. Theoretical Model
The recurring message in each topic survey was the need for a
28s. Okun, Trends in Birth Rates in the United States since 1870, 
studies in Historical and Political Science, series 77 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1958).
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model which recognizes the interdependencies between female participa­
tion, fertility, marriage, and time value. Past theoretical models 
require two major changes to satisfy these requirements. First, a sep­
arate function determining time value must be added. Besides adding 
information about the interrelationship between time value and household 
demands, the theoretical time value function is a necessary first step 
in formulating an empirically meaningful time value measure. Second, 
Becker's household demand function must be modified to include a substi­
tution effect if theoretical models are to become more representative of 
the household decision-making process.
The general approach adopted here follows Willis's lead in opti­
mizing utility levels subject to appropriate constraints within a neo­
classical utility function framework. Both the first and second order 
total differentials are checked to insure that the optimality conditions 
are satisfied. Further, the model's demand components are analyzed to 
test their consistency with actual events and the manner in which these 
demands are related. If these conditions are satisfied, then the theo­
retical model will provide a solid basis for deriving empirically test­
able hypotheses.
B. Empirical Model
The true value of the theoretical model and its ability to ex­
plain the family decision-making process requires formal testing. Past 
models have estimated these relationships from aggregate time series 
data or median cross-section data using single equation techniques to 
accomplish this goal. The approach adopted here deviates from the
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traditional methods in two ways. First, comprehensive information on 
women 30-44 and their families for 1967 from the National Longitudinal 
Survey is used in order to minimize the aggregation errors common to 
time series and median cross-sectional data. A second modification in­
volves estimating these non-linear demand curves with twin linear prob­
ability and Tobit analysis because the high degree of interdependence 
between the variables within the theoretical model, estimation of the 
relationship between these variables by ordinary least squares is incon­
sistent from a logical viewpoint and leads to a significant statistical 
bias in the parameter estimates.
A further challenge to the model's comprehensibility involves 
testing it against black and white culture in order to check for major 
demand differences between the races. Two techniques are used to meas­
ure culturally imposed demand variations. The simplest of the two 
approaches merely estimates a separate model for each sample culture.
The weakness of this approach is our inability to test for significant 
parameter differences between equations except under restrictive circum­
stances. An alternative approach— analysis of covariance— captures 
slope and intercept effects among the various cultural groups through 
the use of dummy variables. The limitations on each technique are dis­
cussed in more detail in a later chapter.
IV. SUMMARY
Although Becker precipitated the ever increasing study of house­
hold demand, Cain suggested that a better approach is to assume that.
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"the whole pattern of family life— marriage and divorce rates, the number 
and timing of births, decisions about schooling and decisions to retire—  
has been affected by, and in turn affects, the large increase in market 
employment of wives." Partial fulfillment of this change is the goal of 
this research. While the theory section moves a long way toward satis­
faction of this end by specifying the nature of the interrelationship 
among the components of household demand, the empirical section falls 
behind the theoretical formulation of the model as the result of the in­
ability to quantify important variables. The failure of the empirical 
work to keep pace with theory is consistent with the normal relationship 
between theory and empiricism. Despite this limitation, this quantita­
tive research extends our understanding of household demand determinants.
Chapter II discusses details of previous neoclassical analysis 
of households, develops the extended model and the reasons for the spe­
cific formulation, calculates the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for maximization, and interprets the results. Appendix A to Chapter II 
generalizes the model developed in Chapter II. Chapter III modifies the 
paradigm in Chapter II to permit estimation, discusses the specification 
of equations, how they relate to the theoretical model, estimates the 
equations, and interprets the results for a traditional specification of 
the problem. Chapter IV modifies the traditional approach by including 
a general value of time measure and estimating the equations via the 
twin linear probability model and Tobit analysis. Chapter V summarizes 
the results.
CHAPTER II 
OPTIMIZATION OF HOUSEHOLD DEMAND
I. Introduction 
Acknowledged confusion existing within household demand theory 
over the proper value of time and the assumption that family members' 
utility levels are independent inhibits economic theory in its search 
for a better understanding of household demand determination. In spe­
cific, original criticism by Johnson of the approach equating time value 
and wage rates has recently been shown to also hold for non-workers and 
part-time workers alike by Gronau and Willis, respectively. In the for­
mer instance wage rates understate time value and overstate it in the 
latter. Further, the assumed independence among the respective family 
member utility levels disturbs economists and non-economics alike be­
cause it implies that individuals marry and have children solely to 
increase their consumption of tangible goods and services. Instead, 
these critics maintain that increased consumption is not necessarily 
the only factor nor the dominating influence in demand determination. 
This chapter incorporates these criticisms of existing household demand 
theory into one model to test the validity of the disputed wage rate 
time valuation procedure and utility independence assumption.
Section II, part A, reviews previous utility function specifi­
cations and equation constraints, and part B illustrates the reasons
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and methods for switching to an alternative time value measure. Section
III defines a unified model of family demand and formation. In Section
IV the model is solved for its first and second order conditions for 
equilibrium and its major characteristics are discussed. The final ' 
section summarizes the major conclusions.
II. Previous Specifications and Alternatives
A. Previous Models
1. Utility Functions
The basic approach, to utility formulation follows Becker’s lead 
in specifying utility as a function of home produced goods, or U = U(Z), 
where Z = home produced goods. An equivalent method makes home produced 
goods a function of market goods, X, and time inputs, T^. Inserting 
Z = Z(X,T^) into the utility equation gives U = UfZCX/Ig)] = U'fX.Tg) 
where U' is a composite function of the functions U and Z. Though the 
general tendency is to follow the original approach of Becker or its 
modification, others subdivide both market goods and time into their 
alternative uses to allow for closer inspection of individual household 
demand determination. For example, Willis believes that valid conclu­
sions regarding fertility policies depend upon separating the utility 
generating aspects of children into quality and quantity components. 
Similarly, Gronau includes market goods, home goods, and leisure for 
both husband and wife to compute the value of time, while Ben Porath 
limits the utility producing arguments to market goods and child quality. 
For exposition a summary of these and other postulations are summarized 
in Table 2.1 by author and purpose.
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TABLE 2.1
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF THE UTILITY FUNCTION
Functional Forms Author
1. U = Uj(X;T) = U(Z)
when Z = f(X,T), so 
U(Z) = U(f) = U(ZX;T)
2. U = Ü2(X;Z;Lj^;Lp)
3. U = UgCX.C) = UgfN.S) = UgCX.N.Q)
4. U = U.(Z.C)
De Serpa, Becker (65), 
Gregory, Lindert, Becker, 
Michael, Gronau (73)
Gronau
Ben-Porath, Willis, 
Becker (73)
DeTray
*The meaning of each variable is as follows: X = market goods,
T = time, Z = household goods and services produced by combining market 
goods and services and household time, L^ = leisure time of the male,
L = leisure time of the female, N = number of children, Q = average 
F
quality of children, C = child services, S = parents' level of consump­
tion.
As is always the case, the limitations and strengths of each 
functional form depends upon their respective purposes. Here the study 
of the simultaneous interaction among the components of household demand 
suggests combining certain elements of each approach in Table 1 into a 
general formulation. To this end, Gronau's recognition of utility inter­
dependence between the husband, wife and children and leisures contribu­
tion to utility seems to be a good starting point. One failing of 
Gronau's approach follows from his assumption that time spent in the
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labor force produces neither utility nor disutility, and the incorpora­
tion of individual family members into the utility function limits the 
usefulness of the Samuelson-Bergson theorem of multi-member utility maxi­
mization (to be explained later).
Following Gronau's specification and its limitations, an alterna­
tive formulation of utility determination is found in equation (2.1):
U = U(X,Z,L,S,N) (2.1)
where U = utility, L = leisure, S = characteristics of the marital 
partner, N = number of children, and X,Z are defined as before. The addi­
tion of the only different variable from those listed in Table 2.1, S, 
accounts for satisfaction derived from the marriage partner and follows 
from the criticisms of current population research by Norman Ryder in 
specific, and other non-economists in general. Ryder in a formal 
appraisal of Willis's studies that also applies to all economic studies 
of population says.
Willis presents a model within a framework of the economic 
theory of the family, but he proceeds about this important task 
by systematically destroying the idea of the family. The family 
in its skeleton form consists of a flow of person-years through 
time, encompassing the adult lifetime of one male and one female 
and the non-adult lifetimes of a varying number of children (in­
cluding zero). The members of the family are bound to each other
29Gronau recognizes the deficiency of this assumption and its 
ability to significantly alter his conclusions, but still adopts this 
approach.
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by contract, with clear specifications, inter alia, of the direc­
tions and amounts of flows of resources and services from one to 
another member. Willis has combined time into the instant of 
initial decision, he has defined the children as objects and 
parents as subjects, he has denied the members the right to take 
satisfaction of others, he has merged the husband and wife into 
a single utility function of the individual type— in short, he 
has solved the problems of family economics by dissolving the 
family. To give one specific example: there is no characteris­
tic of the child save perhaps the requirement of the expenditure 
of time as well as other resources that makes the model any dif­
ferent from one concerned with any other purchase.
Although Ryder's misunderstanding of economic modeling in the neoclas­
sical tradition is acknowledged, his evaluation of the economic approach 
to family economics contains valid observations. Of these, the inability 
of the husband or wife to draw satisfaction from the other opens formal 
household demand analysis to a multidisciplinary group of critics.
In essence, Ryder argues that the success and/or failure of one
family member directly affects the satisfaction of other family members.
Examples familiar to most readers are a wife's increase in satisfaction
when her husband completes his doctoral requirements, publishes his
first research paper, presents his first paper at some meeting, etc.
With regard to children, their first steps, their initial speech,
entrance into school, their first date, and graduation from high school
30and college are all sources of reward to the parents. In an opposite 
manner both children and mates can also act in a way which offsets their 
positive contributions to utility.
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Willis's justification for adopting a family utility function 
in lieu of summing the individual utility functions is his appeal to 
Samuelson's proof of the equivalence of the two approaches when there is 
no joint consumption and no interdependency in utility. Willis argues 
further that the family responds systematically to changes in the posi­
tion of constraints and therefore the interdependency assumption is valid 
for many situations.
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One way to answer Ryder's criticisms is by viewing the utility 
maximization decision from the individual's or wife's perspective and 
including the mate and children as determinants into the utility func­
tion. Approaching the question of utility maximization from this
vantage point minimizes the interdependency problem by permitting direct
31
analysis of the possible utility interdependency.
2. Type of Constraints
a) Income constraint
Presently, income constraints are specified as opportunities 
foregone by both the husband and wife in the labor market plus non-wage 
income in the general form of equation (2.2):
I = Tp'*? + TM'*M +  V (2-2)
where I = full income, V = non-wage income, Tp = total amount of time 
available for wage earning activity by the female, = potential wage 
rate (or a measure of opportunity cost), = potential male wage rate, 
and - total amount of male's time allocated for wage earning activity. 
Equation (2.2) is the standard one found in household demand models, but 
I, defined as full income rather than nominal income, represents poten­
tial income realizable from working the biological number of hours per 
day, and this time is normally assumed to be greater than the actual 
work day.
3l0ne assumption consistent with past research is the exclusion 
of hours worked from the utility function to prevent the impact of mak­
ing time value endogenous from being confused with a multitude of 
changes. After these implications are explored, hours worked is in­
serted into the utility function in Appendix A.
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In order to incorporate an endogenous time value measure the 
wage rate time value measure, W, in equation (2.2), is replaced with a 
general time value approximation, V^, in equation (2.3). This change 
is illustrated by:
I = Tp.V^ + T^.V^ + V (2.3)
where all the variables are defined as before, = permanent male time 
value, and = permanent female time value. Full income defined in 
equation (2.3) differs from the traditional full income definition in
equation (2.2) by the magnitude, V - W which varies directly with the
I »
difference between primary work force wages and marginal productivity
in home production.
Although the modification in equation (2.3)'is minor, its im-
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pact upon a system of total differentials will be major. For this 
reason, a precise definition of awaits the detailed discussion of 
time value in part B of this section.
b) Home production constraint
Following Becker, the distinguishing household demand feature 
is the Marshallian utility maximization process in which goods and 
services produced for individual consumption directly affect the optimal 
utility level. Although one household production constraint takes
^^Because the components of household demand are closely inter­
related, small variations in time value do not necessarily produce small 
impacts upon family consumption patterns after the changes work them­
selves through the system.
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market goods and services and time inputs as the primary determinants, 
a commonly adopted modification separates the time contributions into 
separate male and female components and includes a measure for effi­
ciency in the production process. Equation (2.4) details an example:
Z = Z(X,T^,t“ ,p ) (2.4)
where Z = array of household produced goods, p = an efficiency parameter,
= time spent producing Z by the male, and = time spent producing Z 
Z 2
by the wife.
An alternative method for expressing home production popular­
ized by Willis converts the production function in equation (2.4) into 
a cost function. The dual of the production function has several advan­
tages for utility maximization work. First, the cost concept fits 
easily into the income identity. Secondly, the scale and shadow price 
parameters allow for substitution among the factor inputs. Further, 
the dual allows us to separate expenditures into their fixed and vari­
able cost portions. All of these factors are summarized below.
Assuming that the cost of any home produced good is composed of 
endogenous and exogenous components, can be divided into two elements:
■ w
Eg = [Pg + Pg(V^,S)]*Z (2.5)
where all of the variables are defined as before. In this comparative 
static framework, the exogenous portion of costs, P^, are illustrated by
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fixed costs or depreciation charges in durable goods usage. The endo­
genous cost portion, P^CV^jS), arises from valuing time used in home
33production valuation in a determined— not a predetermined— manner.
For comparison with standard wage rate time valuation procedures, equa­
tion (2.5) reduces to Willis's expenditure function whenever wage rate
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time valuation and are equivalent.
The second factor explaining home goods cost, S, reflects the 
spouse's partial control over the home produced goods composition and 
quality. Existence of alternative preferences among mates for home pro­
duced goods forces the primary producer— the wife— to alter the products 
quality to satisfy these demands. Optimal spouse selection thus re­
quires equating a woman's home production capabilities with the poten­
tial mate's demands. For instance, a woman may find marriage to a rich 
husband desirable in every way except for her inability to satisfy his 
home produced good demands. Although this reasoning seems spurious, 
marriages where the husband interacts with other upper income or moves 
in well educated circles and his wife cannot operate there for whatever 
reason are rare. In essence, the rarity of Liza Doolittles indicates 
that potential mates do relate home production capabilities with demand.
Because recent fertility studies have separated child production 
from home production in order to study the specific differences between
33For a more detailed explanation of the logic behind equation 
(2.5), see Mankin, op. cit., pp. 470-74.
^^Willis argues that the linear relationship between wage rate 
and time value justifies the former's use, but in light of Gronau's 
theoretical and empirical research, this conclusion must be ques­
tioned .
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child quantity and quality determinants, the latest debate in fertility 
theory concerns the quality-quantity function determinants and income 
elasticities. Included as well are all of the difficulties associated 
with quality measurement in general economic theory. The quality- 
quantity advocates claim that the potential high elasticity of substi­
tution between quality and quantity justifies this separation. To 
emphasize this point Willis, Becker-Lewis, and others cite the observed 
smaller family sizes among high income groups as representative of this 
group's attempt to maximize child services through reductions in child 
quantity and increases in average quality. At the same time lower in­
come groups are believed to sacrifice average quality per child in order 
to increase child quantity.
Counterarguments to the quality-quantity position— originally 
suggested by Duesenberry and later adopted by Gregory and Leibenstein—  
propose a low elasticity of substitution since most major quantity 
expenditures are provided free (in the form of education) or are insig­
nificant (in marginal food and clothing costs for additional children). 
The combined effect of these factors is presumed to affect only the in­
come and substitution elasticity magnitudes— not the choice of fertility 
determinants.
To specify the quality-quantity determinants, Willis first com­
putes full income. Then full income, along with the shadow prices for
/
children and the composite good, is inserted into the three cost func­
tions determining child quality, child quantity, and child services 
(child quantity time quality). Willis's two step process is discarded
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here partly because quality-quantity details can be analyzed equally as 
well with one cost function, but also because income is actually a con­
straint upon the entire expenditure function— not just a child service 
determinant. Both points can be illustrated by referring to equation 
(2 .6);
Ej, = (2.6)
where = total expenditures for children and the remaining variables 
are previously defined. Equation (2.6) conforms to the traditional 
cost function formulation with the output scale function, N, and the 
shadow prices, and P^. The general output scale parameter accounts 
for Willis's quantity considerations, and likewise, quality is found by 
observing the price input levels for any given quantity of children. To 
illustrate, two families— both with the same number of children— will 
produce different quality children if one family expends a relatively 
larger amount of mother's time or market goods upon the children. Qual­
ity is thus determined by the intensity of factor inputs when quantity 
is held constant for any income level.
Although the approach specified in equation (2.6) simplifies 
existing theoretical quality-quantity demand studies, the inability to 
measure child quality prevents a direct empirical test of Becker's 
assertion that the child quality elasticity exceeds unity and the quan­
tity elasticity is positive, but approaches zero. A further problem 
involves determining the extent to which child expenditures vary with 
income. If income and child expenditures are closely related, then the
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constraint placed upon total family expenditures by full income in equa­
tion (2.6) still fails to provide an empirical measurement of quality- 
quantity income elasticity differences.
c) Time resource constraint
Addition of a time constraint to the household maximization 
model limits time allocation to total time available over any specified 
horizon, usually the 24 hours in a day, Tq , by equating total available 
time with all possible time uses. For example, some possible time uses 
are defined in equation (2.7) as:
?0 = + ?N + ?L + ?Z = 24 (2.7)
where T q = total time available, Ty = time spent working, = time 
spent on leisure, = time spent on children, and = time spent on
home produced goods. Here the unsettled issue involves a dispute over 
the proper definition of T^. The biological group argues that human 
sleep requirements prevent T^ from equalling 24 hours. Countering this 
position is the belief that these biological needs are incorporated into 
the specific time uses in equation (2.7). Because both results produce 
the same results, this study uses 24. However, proponents of a biolog­
ical constraint upon time activity may replace T^ for 24 without changing
35
the model's interpretation.
35Another constraint proposed by De Serpa to restrict time spent 
consuming goods and services is not discussed here because Mankin demon­
strates how the same effect can be introduced by making hours of work 
flexible.
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B. Time Value
The failure of wage rates to attract housewives into the labor 
force, and the wage rate time value measures disregard for diminishing 
marginal utility for labor force participants from working, supports the 
arguments by Gronau, Willis, Johnson, and De Serpa for development of an 
alternative time value measure. In specific, a non-working woman's 
underestimated time value can be corrected by using her reservation wage 
instead of an "expected wage rate." Correction of labor force partici­
pants' overestimate of time value by wage rates requires information on 
the number of hours worked, availability of overtime work, the over­
time pay schedule, and the number of hours required before the employee 
is eligible for overtime pay, and upon alternative employment opportun­
ities. These correction factors are combined to form an alternative 
time value measure, V^.
Time value correction factors for full time and part-time 
employed women as well as non-workers are illustrated in equation (2.8) 
by;
RW; if not in the labor force 
WR(HW/40) + 0*WR(HW/4O - 1); if employed
Vrj, = (2.8)
where RW = the woman's reservation wage, WR = her wage rate, HW = her 
hours worked, 0 = overtime pay schedule, and V,j, = her resultant time 
value. Reservation wage, RW, corresponds with Gronau's suggested replace­
ment for wage rate time valuation of non-working women. The second 
element in equation (2.8) represents a synthesis of existing proposals
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for measuring employed workers' time value that includes wage rates.
Wage rate time valuation is shown to be a special case of by noting 
that women working 40 hours per week (HW = 40) and paid straight time 
overtime (0 = 0) have a time value which equals to her wage rate, or 
= WR(40/40) + 0*WR(40-40)/40 = WR. In an opposite manner, changing 
the work week to 60 hours and assuming the same overtime pay schedule 
gives = WR(60/40) + 0*WR(60-40)/40 = WR"1.5, or exceeds wage rate 
time valuation by 50%.
Similarly, part-time workers' time value is approximately half 
of the wage rate valuation approach when double time overtime pay (0 = 1) 
and a 20 hour work week are assumed, or = WR(20/40) + 2 ‘WR(20-40)/40 
= 0.5‘WR. In this instance, as in the preceding ones, nominal wage rates 
only equal the general time value measure when a 40 hour work week and 
straighttime overtime are found.
Because equation (2.8) is unsuitable for a Lagrangian maximiza­
tion procedure, its common elements are synthesized into the implicit 
functional form described in equation (2.9) as:
= V^(WR,HW,0) (2.9)
where all the variables are defined above. The advantage of equation
(2.9) over traditional wage time valuation arises from the greater use 
of information about the individual's market activity.
In defense of theoretical time value studies, their time value 
measure is really the "potential" wage rate, not the actual wage rate 
usually assumed in empirical studies.
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The derivation of equation (2.9) will permit formal measurement of 
errors in household demand analysis as a result of wage rate time valu­
ation.
III. The Model
The household demand model maximized below makes several dis­
tinct deviations from existing household demand models. First, wife's 
demand is maximized in a setting in which the husband becomes one 
utility determining element in order to weigh the validity of the util­
ity independence assumption by Willis and others. Spouse characteris­
tics are formally entered into the utility function and various expen­
diture functions to directly test the spouse's impact upon the female's 
demand pattern. If this impact is significant, then the utility inde­
pendence assumption becomes untenable for future household demand re­
search. More importantly, a positive demonstration that family member 
utility interdependence can be properly handled mathematically supports 
social scientists' attempts to organize the complex household demand 
behavior pattern into formal analytical models and provides hope for 
extending the household demand model to include this interaction within 
a jointly determined framework.
Secondly, making wage rate time valuation a special case of a 
more general time valuation procedure produces a more accurate measure 
of the elements in the utility functions respective responses to changes 
in the value of time. For example, Willis's and Becker-Lewis's asser­
tion that time value is a linear function of wage rates leads them to 
the rationale for equating the two. To the extent that the shadow price
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of children can be associated with the mother's time value (as it is in 
the quality arguments), a one unit increase in wage rates will not neces­
sarily produce a corresponding one unit increase in the shadow price of 
children here. As explained above, this difference depends upon hours 
worked and overtime pay rates as well as the market wage rate.
A. Formulation of the Model
Following the reasoning set down in Section II, the woman's 
utility level is maximized via application of Lagrangian analysis to 
the utility function and constraining equations depicted in equation 
(2.10):
L = U(X,Z,S,L,N) + X{24[V^(0,WR) -b V^(S)] 4- Y -b Y^(S)
- P%'X - [P^ + P2(V^(0,WR),S)]-Z - P^[V^(0,WR),Pj^;N]
- L-V^(0,WR) - Lg(S)*V^(S)} (2.10)
where all of the variables are defined in Section II, except for 
= the husband's leisure time.
One major change in equation (2.10) drops HW from the deter­
mining function in order to minimize an already complex mathematical 
notation. For convenience 0 can be redefined to include the composite 
interaction of overtime pay and hours worked without a significant 
information loss in subsequent analysis. Another deviation from the 
usual formulation combines more detailed income and cost components into 
one budget constraint. Instead of dividing costs into household and 
child costs and combining all income factors into one component.
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equation (2.10) separates income into human and non-human capital income 
and divides costs into their detailed sources.
Comparison of the first and second order maximization conditions 
for equation (2.10) with the ones derived in Willis’s model should sub­
stantiate or disprove current economic opinion that family utility 
levels are independent and time value can be equated with wage rates.
If either opinion is found to be incorrect, together or separately, then 
future household demand methodologies must also be altered to include 
more viable assumptions.
B . Calculations
1. Necessary Conditions
Taking the partial of the Lagrangian function in equation (2.10) 
with respect to X, Z, L, S, N, V^, X, and after setting them equal to 
zero, the first order conditions become:
8L/9X = = 0
9L/3Z = Uz - A{P2 + P 2 [Vx (0,WR),S]} = 0 
9L/3L = Ul - X-Vt (0,WR) = 0
9L/9S = Ug - A*[24(9V^/9S) + 9Y^/9S - (9p2/9S)'Z
- (9L^/9S)-V^(0,WR) - (9V^/9S)*L^] = 0
9L/9N = - A(9P^/9N) = 0
9L/9V^ = A[24 - (9P2/9V^)*Z - (9Pj^/9V^) - L] = 0
9L/9A = 24-[V^(0,WR) + V^(S)] + Y + Y^(S) - P^'X
- [Pg + P2*(V^(0,WR),S)]-Z - P^[V^(0,WR),Pj^;N]
- L*V^(0,WR) - L^(S)-V^(S) = 0 (2.11)
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and setting = 1 as the numeraire, the marginal conditions for equi­
librium are found to be:
V ^ X  " (2.13)
Ug/U% = 24(3vS/9S) + (3Yg/aS) - (9?2/9Z)*Z
- (3V^/3S)*L^ - (3L^/9S)‘V^CG.WR) (2.14)
U^/Ux = 3Pjj/3N (2.15)
24 - L = (3P2/3V^)-Z - (3Pjj/3V^) (2.16)
In summary, equation (2.12) says the marginal rate of substitution be­
tween the composite good, X, and the home produced good, Z, equals the 
sum of the exogenous and endogenous home produced good prices, or 
NRSgyx “ {Pg + P2[V^(G,WR),S]}. Similarly, equations (2.13)-(2.15) show 
that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure, spouse, and 
children with the composite good is, respectfully
V^(G,WR), [24(3V^/3S) - (BPg/BS) - (3v|/3S)-L^ - (3L^/3S)*V^(G,WR)], and 
3Pjj/3N. Finally, equation (2.16) illustrates the standard rise in expen­
ditures to match a corresponding increase in income. Further, following 
Willis, equations (2.12)-(2.16) can be combined to insure a local equi­
librium position by forcing the individual to consume units of each pro­
duct until the ratio of marginal utility to price equals the marginal 
utility of money, 1/1, for all specified commodities.
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Because the impact of pertinent exogenous variables upon the 
total system cannot be determined from equations (2.12)-(2•16), these 
equations are converted into total differentials to formally test the 
impact of a few determining variables, specifically wage rates, upon the 
sufficient conditions for equilibrium.
2. Total Differential Test for Sufficiency
Examples of converting first order conditions into total differ­
entials can be found in Henderson-Quandt, and is therefore performed 
here without explanation except to note that the total differential per­
mits formal explication of the spouse's effect upon final equilibrium 
utility level and the extent to which the general time value approxima­
tion dictates a different equilibrium position than the traditional wage 
rate approach. In summary, the second order conditions for equilibrium 
are given in Table 2 within the usual bordered Hessian matrix form.
To simplify the bordered Hessian matrix, time value, family 
size, and spouse selection equations are converted into their reduced 
form equations equivalents by applying Cramer's rule to Table 2.
dV^/dWR = {X[(3P2/3V^)OV^/3WR)-D2g + VAL^-D^^,
+  O V j / 3 H E ) - D 3 5  +  V M . 3 . D 3 3  +  V A L ^ - D j g ]
- VALj'Djj)/D (2.17)
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dN/dWR = {Xtcap^/sv^)(3V^/3WR)*D^^ + VAL^'D^^
+ (9V /9WR)*D + VAL *0 + VAL *D ]
T 35 4 55 5 65
- VAL *D^ }/D (2.18)
6 75
ds/DWR = {^[(BPg/av^jcav^yawBj'Dg^ + v a l ^-d ^^
+ (3V^ /3WR)-D^  ^+ VAL^'Dg^ + VAL^ -D^ ]^
- yALg-D^^}/D (2.19)
where D is the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix and D^j 
signifies the cofactors of the elements in the bordered Hessian prin­
cipal diagonal matrix.
Because Willis provides a sound reasoning process for converting 
the above equations into elasticity form and plausible signs for the 
resultant elasticities, subsequent analysis concentrates upon the impli­
cations for future household demand research that is derived from the 
spouses presence and an endogenous time value. In general equations 
(2.17)-(2.19) are composed of own price, cross-price, and a Slutsky 
income effect, and in specific, the own price effects are identified 
when i = j in D^j, the Slutsky income effect when i = 7, and the remain­
ing components represent the cross-price effects.
C. Interpretation of Changes 
1. Time Value Endogeneity
Equation (2.17) specifies the relationship between the current 
popular definition of time value— wage rates, and the alternative
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offered here, V^. Keeping the popular assumption that wage rates are 
exogenous in the presence of the assumption that time value depends upon 
factors other than just wage rates, such as hours worked and overtime 
pay, allows determination of the conditions under which the two approaches 
will diverge.
Foremost among the initial observations of equation (2.17) is 
the failure of wage rates to show a linear relationship with the value 
of time. Specifically, the results in equation (2.17) reduce to those 
presented by Willis only when time value is forced to equal wage rates, 
by setting = WR, and dV^/dWR = 1 throughout the model. As earlier 
sections have already presented theoretical and empirical arguments 
against this assumption, the remaining task is to summarize the norma­
tive, and most scathing, criticisms of this assumption. In a compendium 
of reviews on Linder's Harried Leisure Class time value and wage rates 
are shown to differ by a variety of authors because of individual pref­
erences for work, leisure, and home activity. For example, Phelps cited 
the utility generating nature of long periods of work, while others indi­
cated an attempt to minimize work loads in order to increase their utility 
level. All of the opinions suggested that not only does dV^/dWR ^ 1, but 
that the exact degree to which and WR deviate varies from one individ­
ual to another.
In order to maintain continuity with wage rate time monetariza- 
tion, the hypothesized relationship between and WR is assumed to be 
positive, or dV^/dWR > 0. However, even when the positive relationship 
holds, household demand reaction to the two measures can differ
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significantly. In the family size equation (equation (2.18)), the rela­
tionship between and WR enters into the own price, all the cross­
price, and the Slutsky income effect. Therefore, following standard 
neoclassical theories belief in a positive income effect, a negative 
own price effect and negative cross-price effect for normal goods, some 
possible scenarios can be analyzed. However, Tirst note that the nega­
tive sign assumed for cross-price effects in general, and home produced 
goods in specific, is questioned by Duesenberry's and Gregory's argument 
that standard-of-living cannot be substituted for children. Rather, 
quality expenditures are not discretionary because children receive the 
benefits from their parents' chosen life style. Readers wishing to fol­
low this line of reasoning can easily alter the following analysis to 
assume complementarity.
If dV^/dWR > 1, then the wage rate time valuation understates 
time prices effect upon family size and incomes effect on expected family 
size is overstated. The exact magnitudes of the income effects over­
statement and price effects understatement could cancel the potential 
error. But since no a priori reasons exist to believe that these errors 
will sum to zero, wage rate time valuation erroneously predicts family 
size adjustments depending upon whether the price or income effect domi­
nates.
Perhaps the real failing of the assumed positive, linear rela­
tionship between wage rates and time value can be illustrated in the 
familiar setting of a backward bending supply curve. At some point along 
the labor supply curve the decline in labor force activity as wages rise
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implies a reduction in the opportunity cost of time. This paradox— a 
higher wage rate and reduced time value— cannot be explained since the 
wage rate model has not established a causal relationship between leisure 
and work. Instead, the general time valuation model explains the shift 
from work to leisure by the absence of any restriction on the magnitude 
and sign of dV^/dWR. Given the conditions determined by 6, the dV^/dWR 
sign can take on a positive value when the opportunity cost of working 
dominates, and a negative sign when the utility obtained from leisure 
exceeds work benefits.
Another issue raised by the preceding discussion concerns the
rate of change between the alternative time value measures. Time value
and wage rates are linearly related only when the nonnegativity implied
in neoclassical diminishing marginal utility theory becomes applicable
to household demand theory. If not, monetarization of time spent in any
activity at a linear rate overstates that activity’s actual value to the
2 2
individual. The linearity condition implies that d V^/dWR = 1 .  In 
lieu of the normative arguments of Phelps and others plus the findings 
specified earlier, the expected rate of change in utility generation is 
expected to diminish as additional time is allocated to any given activ­
ity. Depending upon the actual rate at which utility diminishes, wage 
rate time valuation further overstates changes in the consumption bundle. 
Although wage rate time valuation is anticipated to differ from the gen­
eral measure proposed here, the actual magnitude cannot be determined 
until both techniques are compared empirically.
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2. Spouse Effects
To establish the degree to which the spouse affects the female's 
utility determinants, the cross-price effects between the spouse and 
female's time (equation (2.17)) and child selection equation (equation 
(2.18)) can be evaluated. In both equations, the spouse effect enters 
as a determining factor through VALg. Specifically, the element 
VAL^ = (aP^/SSSVcj) (8Vj/8WR) indicates that the change in the female's 
time value stimulated by a wage rate shift affects the husband inspired 
marginal home produced goods expenditures by the first order partial 
derivative condition. In the child demand equation, a positive coef­
ficient for VALg weighted by (X*D^^)/D suggests an increase in family 
size since the positive sign makes the two complements, and therefore 
raises the female's utility level depending upon the formal relationship 
between N and utility. Conversely, a negative signed magnitude makes 
the husband and children substitutes in utility formation. The actual 
relationship between husband and children may be positive for the 
initial decision to bear children because of socially imposed mores 
which bestow approval upon married mothers and stigmatize fatherless 
children. However, the shift in time allocated from the spouse to the 
newborn child could reverse this sign.
A mathematical expression in which the cross-price effect for 
children determined by VAL^ produces a family size that does not equal 
the family size levels predicted from the woman's price and income 
effects, gives content to observed interaction among married couples to 
determine individual utility levels. If VAL^ f 0, then the husband will
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have imposed an equilibrium position upon the wife which is not equiv­
alent to equilibrium when utility independence is assumed. As expected 
from standard maximization theory, addition of constraints produces an 
equilibrium position which lowers the optimizing consumption level.
Determining the sign of VAL^ depends upon the relative strength 
of Becker's complementarity argument for marriage— spouses are acquired 
to obtain societies acceptance for child conception— relative to the 
extent to which children are substitutes for other commodities. Thus, 
the spouse's effect upon child acquisition depends upon their direct 
impact upon the wife's attitudes and their indirect effect upon other 
expenditures, e.g., home produced goods. Although these relative magni­
tudes have never been empirically determined, the child number equation 
does not reduce to an equation equivalent to those found by Willis ex­
cept when VALg approaches 0. The term VAL^ has never been empirically 
tested because existing research has always assumed it was zero. But 
given the prominent position accorded husband's income and attitudes in 
the existing labor supply and fertility literature suggests that the 
likely spouse effect upon woman's utility is not zero. To assume that 
it is zero makes theory and its empirical expression inconsistent.
Again, these mathematical results find important differences 
between the female's unconstrained and constrained response pattern. 
This shows that the assumption of utility independence provides an erro­
neous base for subsequent household demand analysis.
3. Other Effects
One final observation bears upon the current disagreement over
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the "true" child income elasticity. Estimated elasticities in the nega­
tive and low, positive range have led Becker-Lewis and others to reason 
that the failure of these empirical results to produce an elastic in­
come demand is caused by a negative or low, positive quantity demand 
elasticity interacting with the elastic quality demand. Therefore, 
only by separating quality and quantity can the "true" income elasticity 
be ascertained. Another interpretation proposed here suggests that one 
other possible cause of the low elasticities arises from the failure to 
distinguish between the human capital and the non-human wealth income 
components in the income constraint.
Applying Barzel-McDonald*s equivalent arguments for labor par­
ticipation to a time value formulation which depends upon factors other 
than wage rates implies that changes in human capital income levels 
shifts the budget constraint and the relative prices of goods that are 
dependent upon the same time value measure. Thus, human capital income 
represents price as well as income constraint shift. Conversely, non-
S
human capital movements, dY and dY (S), do imply a straight change in 
the budget constraint. The different response patterns to human capital 
and net asset income can be illustrated in the child selection equation. 
Net asset income acts only on the total income elasticity level, whereas 
the human capital position also alters the own and cross-price effects. 
One possible event could find negative human capital coefficients for 
dN/dWR and a positive sign for the non-human income figure. Depending 
upon the irrelative magnitudes, empirical studies using different data
49
bases could find both positive or negative child income elasticities.
The division between human and non-human capital income, if any, 
usually occurs early in theoretical studies. Later the two income con­
cepts are aggregated in the final analysis, such as Becker, Becker-Lewis,
Willis, and others. In VAL_, the change in assets— or the straighto
shift in the budget constraint— is represented by dY, while the human 
capital income portion is represented for the female and male members by 
VAL^ and VAL^, respectively. These results have remained separated in 
order to provide a basis for empirically testing each income measure's 
impact upon family size and labor force participation.
IV. Summary
The model developed here partially advances the current state of 
household demand theory by relaxing the restrictive utility independence 
assumption and providing a flexible time value measure. Assigning to 
individuals attitudes that stem wholly from the satisfaction of selfish 
factors as the primary reason for household formation, and then ignoring 
these selfish patterns after household formation occurs is, at best, in­
consistent and, in actuality, a failure of current theory to fit economy 
theory to the family instead of molding the family in the image of eco­
nomics. The results obtained earlier show that rearranging household 
demand for purposes of economic analysis is unnecessary when a more 
detailed specification is undertaken.
Among the significant deviations from existing research are ex­
plicit consideration of alternative reasons for forming multi-member
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households besides the conception of children. In this model, the 
spouse is viewed as a utility generating factor apart from their usual 
specification as a complementary item in the production of children, 
production of other household items, and an income resource. In short, 
the work of Becker, Gronau, Freeden, and Keely are assumed to be a spe­
cial case in the process of household decision-making.
For fertility and labor force activity, the discussion follows 
existing lines of thought in main, although different conclusions are 
reached about the optimal allocation of resources as result of endoge- 
nizing time value. In particular, the optimal number of children is 
seen to depend upon marginal changes in time costs and marginal changes 
in the cost of other goods, not just price and income effects. Simi­
larly, labor force activity conclusions differ from existing studies as 
a result of these same changes. The following chapters empirically 
test the importance of these alternative points of view.
\CHAPTER III 
ESTIMATION OF THE TRADITIONAL MODEL
I. Introduction 
Based upon existing criticisms of the "new household demand 
school" of thought's purely economic analysis of household demand, the 
five equations— a marital discriminant equation, spouse selection equa­
tion, the labor force participation discriminant decision, hours worked 
equation, and finally a child stock equation— are estimated using non­
economic as well as economic determinants to test the validity of these 
criticisms. Among the major changes from current empirical studies is 
a direct measure of psychological preferences, and formal consideration 
of black-white sociological differences in household demand patterns. 
Specifically, the criticisms by Leibenstein, Griliches, and non-econo­
mists of studies using only economic variables to determine fertility, 
labor force patterns, and marriage, and by Gregory of the failure to 
include separate factors affecting racial demand are formally evaluated. 
Because the estimated equations combine several areas of household 
demand theory which typically have been studied independently, the 
equations are restricted to a "traditional" specification in order to 
illustrate the relative importance of psychological and sociological 
household demand determinants vis-à-vis the traditional economic deter­
minants. Traditional means that the general time valuation procedure
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and alternative estimation methods will be delayed until the next chapter. 
This chapter uses wage rate time valuation and ordinary least squares 
estimation in order to emphasize the interaction among psychological, 
sociological, and économe variables in household demand formation.
In Section II the data base is discussed in relation to its 
impact upon the empirical results. Section III develops the arguments 
for individual equation specification, and Section IV presents and inter­
cepts the empirical results. Section V summarizes the major conclusions 
derived from the empirical work.
II. Data Source 
The National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) began as a Department of 
Commerce operation to study the labor force patterns of middle-aged males. 
Announcement of the study plans produced pressures from such a variety of 
sources that the sample was extended to include men from the ages of 14 
to 24 and two female samples: 14 to 24 and 30 to 44. Designed to be an
ongoing project after its initiation in 1967, three complete years (to 
1970) are now available for commercial uses with the 1971 and 1972 infor­
mation schedules for sale in early 1975 by Ohio State University.
The advantage of the longitudinal panel survey approach over 
cross-sectional data and aggregate time series are severalfold. In both 
aggregate and microeconomic cross-sectional data, the validity of any 
model rests upon consistency of the variables in cyclical and secular 
variations. Existence of disequilibrium in the relevant markets implies 
future adjustment on the part of the affected variable which may not 
move in accord with the remaining variables. Should such a disequilibrium
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arise, the justification for using cross-sectional data— as an approx­
imation of long-run relationships— becomes untenable. The NLS survey 
data partly compensates for this potential error by including compre­
hensive data on labor force, marital, and fertility variables for years 
preceding 1967 as well as infonnation on subsequent activity. Avail­
ability of this longitudinal information minimizes the bias associated 
with market distortions as long as the analysis of the structural rela­
tionships is limited to the short-run.
Unfortunately the NLS survey data possesses potential sources 
of error that are concurrently solvable and unknown. The solvable error 
source stems from variations in individual preferences and characteris­
tics among regions. In microeconomic data failure to account for re­
gional differences leads to biassed but consistent estimates when the 
misspecified variable is uncorrelated with the error term and both 
biassed and inconsistent parameters when the residual is correlated with 
the misspecified variable. Although the location of the survey respon­
dents is known to the collector, the Department of Commerce refuses to 
reveal the state, much less the city, of residence— regretfully of 
course— on the grounds that the detailed nature of the sample would 
enable an unscrupulous user to discriminate against the respondent. So, 
the absence of locational information is acknowledge here as a possible 
source of error that is curable with existing information.
Another limitation attributable to data uncertainty is the exact 
nature of the sampling procedure. Official proclamations state that
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respondents were randomly selected from a list of U.S. residents used 
by the Department of Commerce. Since the nature of the list is unobtain­
able, inferences about the population from the sample results must be 
made with caution until the samples relationship to the population has 
been documented in greater detail.
In spite of the weaknesses of the data, the NLS survey informa­
tion is still superior to alternative sources of data dealing with house­
hold decision-making and formation by virtue of its longitudinal nature. 
As such, its weaknesses are duly noted, but the offsetting benefits 
should not be forgotten.
III. Equation Specification 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for the five equa­
tions and their exact specifications are detailed under separate head­
ings below. In general, existing economic equation specifications have 
been followed as much as possible except for addition of attitudinal 
variables and an analysis of covariance variable (0 for white and 1 for 
black) to measure differences in racial demand patterns.
A. Marriage Discriminant Equation
The marriage discriminant equation determinants are assumed to 
be the attitude toward children (ATC) , attitude toward housework (ATH), 
attitude toward working (ATW), residence at age 15 (R15), parental 
marital status at age 15 (P15), woman's education level (ED), woman's 
wage income (WY), and the analysis of covariance race variable (RD).
The exact function and variable definitions are given in equation (3.1)
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as:
MD = F^(ATC, ATH, ATW, P15, R15, ED, WY, RD) (3.1)
where MD = 0 when unmarried and 1 when married
ATC = scaled variable from 1 to 5 with 5 representing 
a strong desire for children 
ATH = scaled variable from 1 to 5 with 5 representing 
a strong preference for housework 
ATW = scaled variable from 1 to 5 with 5 representing
the strongest preference for working in the labor 
force
P15 = 0 when residing in rural area at age 15 to 1 when 
located in an urban environment at age 15 
R15 = 0 when parents were still married at age 15 and 1 
when not living together at age 15 
ED = number of years of school completed 
WY = woman's wealth
RD = 0 when woman is white and 1 when the woman is black 
and the sample is limited to those women currently married or never 
married.
Because women with positive preferences for homemaking can 
increase their marginal productivity through marriage an efficient allo­
cative process should produce a positive coefficient for ATH, ceteris 
paribus. However, the importance of the ceteris paribus assumption can 
be illustrated by acknowledging the role of the corresponding work
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attitudes and monetary incentives for labor participation. If the 
woman works, she can participate in home production on a part-time 
basis, use the remaining time for market activity, and then allocate 
a portion of her monetary earnings to purchase labor saving mechanical 
goods or actually hiring other laborers to perform these household 
activities. That is, this explains the phenomenon of working women 
hiring maids or the acquisition of time reducing market goods, such as 
microwave ovens. Thus, women with inclinations toward both home and 
market production maximize their utility by expending time in both 
endeavors. Though the net effect of ATH upon marriage should still be 
positive, the magnitude will vary according to the strength of these 
relative effects.
As a result of the socially imposed more that bestows approval 
upon married couples' children and is critical of fatherless children, 
child attitudes will be positive and have a magnitude that depends upon 
the importance attached to this social force. Of special interest in 
household research is the extent to which the "promiscuous" age alters 
ATC's effect upon the marital decision. One view argues that the net 
effect of "free love" will be to make this constraint ineffective by 
breaking down the socially imposed relationship between marriage and 
child acquisition to the point marriage will no longer be a prerequisite 
for child birth.
An alternative proposition suggests that the real impact of "free 
love" will only be increased premarital experimentation, and does not 
necessarily imply a reduction in the importance of the association
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between marriage and fertility. Advocates of the former position cite 
the increase in the absolute number of unwed mothers for support, while 
the latter claim more unwed mothers are observed because emphasis on 
the premarital pregnancy problem has produced detailed data which es­
caped earlier studies and women in the age group prone to premarital 
sexual activity have increased.
Given the limitation of the NLS sample used here to women in the 
30 to 44 age group, the reported empirical results should represent an 
upper bound for the magnitude of the parameter estimates— with the dif­
ference between the estimated and actual values varying according to 
the strength of the "free love" effect.
Interpreting the attitude toward work coefficient involves 
determining whether a woman with a high preference for working will 
substitute labor force activity for marriage, or will view marriage 
and labor force activity as complementary activities. Existence of a 
negative coefficient will support the position taken by the "male 
chauvinists" that women marry to escape the necessity of having to sup­
port themselves. Conversely, an indication of a strong preference for 
labor force participation and a negative coefficient supports the 
"woman's libbers" position that women suppress their labor force pref­
erences in order to satisfy the demands of their husband and children.
While the foregoing analysis explains the extreme points of the 
opposing positions regarding labor force attitudes, dual activity of 
women as both a laborer and a mother-housekeeper remains to be explained 
as either a logical chain of events or some incongruous activity.
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Positive coefficients for ATW and ATH would support a hypothesis that 
many women derive satisfaction from participating in both the labor 
force and having a family. The often assumed hypothesis that women work 
part-time solely for economic reasons would be contradicted by positive 
ATW and ATH estimates. Because psychologists and sociologists have 
pointed out the need for some women to "get out of the house and into 
meaningful activity," positive coefficients are expected to occur on an 
a priori basis.
A second use of the attitude coefficients involves comparison 
of their signs and magnitudes to test for internal consistency among the 
woman's attitudes. For instance, a woman expressing a strong preference 
for children should also be expected to have at least a mild preference 
for housework since the two decisions are concomitant. Similarly, a 
positive preference for children and work, and a negative desire to par­
ticipate in housework leads to the situation of a working mother. The 
mixture of attitudinal variables suggests that a woman may limit her 
activity to either the home or work force because of the family's eco­
nomic position, institutional regidities, or family demands even though 
she receives satisfaction from both household activity and labor force 
activity. The relative magnitudes of the economic and attitudinal vari­
ables in the empirical results will determine their relative explanatory 
importance.
With regard to the residence at age 15 dummy, Becker, Keely, 
Frieden, and Gronau observe variations in the decision to marry according
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to whether they reside in either a rural or urban setting; specifically 
the assumed higher proportion of married populace among rural dwellers 
is derived from a cultural setting where women are encouraged to form 
their own households to a greater extent than urban dwellers and from 
market conditions where the range of prospective spouses is limited.
Both effects should produce negative coefficients.
The parent's marital status can either reduce the probability 
that the child will marry if the child reacts adversely (a negative coef­
ficient), or increase the probability if marriage is viewed as a mechanism 
for removing themselves from this situation (a positive sign). One fac­
tor limiting the definitive interpretation of a positive coefficient 
involves the compatibility of the original parents; for if their parents 
did not interact in an agreeable manner, then the impact upon the child 
may be worse than dissolution of the marriage. Unfortunately, data limi­
tations do not allow a ready solution to this problem.
Finally, the socioeconomic variables of female income, education, 
and race dummy account for the ability to support oneself without the 
aid of a husband, the ability to obtain and interpret information about 
the marriage market, and sociological variations in the marriage deci­
sion, respectively. More specifically, one of Becker’s hypothesized 
advantages to marriage for low wage earning women is access to individ­
uals with a relatively higher wage income. In essence this view sug­
gests a "why work if you can get someone else to do it for you" attitude. 
Thus, higher wage income women will have a greater incentive to remain 
single than lower wage women.
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Reactions to marriage caused by changes in education levels re­
mains uncertain because little empirical work has been performed on the 
subject to date. Both Frieden and Keeley use education as a determinant 
of the age of marriage and the marriage rate, respectively, and find a 
positive coefficient in both situations. Education affects marriage in 
two ways; by altering marginal productivity capabilities and by in­
creasing the ability to acquire and understand market information. The 
expected positive relationship is founded upon Becker's assertion that 
higher educated individuals can realize greater gains from specializa­
tion than relatively lower educated individuals, and, as such, should 
respond to these potential gains by entering the marriage market.
Significant differences among the two socioeconomic groups will 
be illustrated by the sign and magnitude of the RD coefficient. Occur­
rence of a positive sign means black women have a higher probability of 
marriage than white women of similar characteristics. A negative sign 
indicates just the opposite, cateris paribus. Dominance of either posi­
tion has yet to be ascertained by marriage theorists. On one hand, the 
black female is supposed to react positively to the institution of mar­
riage as a mechanism for removing her from an overcrowded environment 
and encouraged by her parents to do so to alleviate parental financial 
responsibilities. On the other hand, the capability of potential spouses 
to satisfy these demands dictates a sign reversal. Reconciliation of 
these two possibilities is the purpose of this analysis of covariance 
variable.
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B. Assertive Mating Equation
Specifying choice of spouse requires an initial determination of 
the traits a woman might emphasize in deciding upon a mate. Among the 
likely possibilities determined from a multitude of surveys on what 
women look for in a husband are the male's income, education, state of 
health, and various attitudes toward women and their roles in society. 
Other possible factors women might look at are the amount of time spent 
working and the positive externality accruing to the wife of husbands 
in prestigious positions. In the former case the unpleasantness of 
being married to a work "freak" has been well-documented in the psycho­
logical literature. However, in economic terms the wife fails to re­
ceive many of the benefits of marriage when the husband allocates his 
time to activities other than the family. As such, the wife is placed 
in a situation where the spouse provides material wants, but none of the 
wife's emotional needs. The prestige factor is exemplified by the status 
attached to wives of politicians, athletes, intellectuals, etc.
Because a multitude of factors partly determine the "desirability" 
of a particular male, use of any variable by itself will fail to incorpo­
rate all of the potential husband's traits. Instead of arbitrarily 
choosing a particular variable, such as income, all of the variables dis­
cussed above or their reasonable proxy are combined in a factor analytic 
manner to create a quality index. The specification of the factor analy­
sis procedure is presented in equation (3.2) as:
S = Fg(HY, RED, HAT, SOHH, HW, OC) (3.2)
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where S = the index of spouse quality resulting from the
factor analysis 
HY = male’s income 
RED = male’s education
HAT = male’s attitude toward women working 
SOH = male’s state of health
HHW = hours worked on the job daily
OC = occupation code of the male 
Variable HAT represents the man's attitude toward the wife’s labor force
activity. A strong dislike for working women may indicate a general
"male chauvinist" view, while a moderate or liberal stance illustrates a 
more flexible position.
After the quality index, S, has been obtained, the second and 
larger issue involves explaining the importance of particular female 
characteristics in the mating process. The variables are divided into 
attitudinal, family background, and socioeconomic categories as before, 
and listed in equation (3.3) as:
S = F^CATW, WY, ED, FOG, FED, SOH, RD) (3.3)
where all of the variables are defined as before. FOG = father’s occu­
pation code and FED = father’s education.
Inclusion of the variables ATW, WY, ED, and RD is justified for 
reasons similar to their inclusion in equation (3.1). Attitude toward 
work captures the positive association between women who enjoy working 
and males with more tolerant attitudes toward their wives working.
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Dissimilar attitudes toward working does not always mean that a success­
ful marriage is impossible. Given the ceteris paribus assumption, women 
who have high preference for remaining in or entering the labor force 
are unlikely to marry someone with a complete "male chauvinist" attitude 
or believe that "the woman's place is in the home."
Analysis of the potential positive causality flowing from wife's 
income to spouse quality can be seen from several directions: 1) higher
wage earning women possess an asset— their wage earning potential— that 
is the 20th century counterpart to the dowry in earlier time periods;
2) the higher wage also enables the female to attain a higher degree of 
self-sufficiency in the search process for a husband, or in Becker's 
terminology, the woman has the opportunity to gather more information 
about the workings of the marriage market; and 3) a higher wage income 
transforms what may have been an otherwise normally desired woman into 
an asset producing commodity useful to higher quality men. Each of 
these three cases suggests a positive connection between spouse quality 
and the woman's wage income.
As education has been shown to alter preferences for children 
and augment the ability to assimilate and utilize market information in 
the fertility literature, it is assumed to do so here. Likewise, the 
gain in marriage market information that results from marginal increases 
in education reinforces the positive relationship between marriage and 
fertility as long as the female can capitalize upon her enlarged capa­
city to understand the vagaries of the market.
64
The dummy for racial composition will bear a negative sign if 
black males can be considered to be lower quality spouses for whatever 
reason. Although the negative coefficient is plausible given the speci­
fication in equation (3.2), it is counterintuitive to acknowledged posi­
tive preferences among races and cultures to marry within their well- 
defined group. This failing represents one weakness of the analysis of 
covariance approach. Instead, empirical measurement of the strength of 
racial effects awaits separate estimation in the black-white samples.
The final two variables, FOC and FED, capture P. Jacobsen’s 
suggested parental influences upon their children's preferences for a 
husband by identifying surrogates for the characteristics of the woman's 
father, such as "I want a man just like dad" attitude hypothesis. The 
original hypothesis predicted a positive relationship between father's 
characteristics and the eventual spouse. But, since this proposition 
was based upon a congenial father-daughter association, the dual hypoth­
esis that an inverse connection between father's characteristics and 
the chosen spouse could transpire when the daughter did not get along 
with her father. Though both variables are incomplete proxies for the
female's attitude toward her father, they provide quasi-acceptable vari­
ables for testing the impact of the father upon his daughter's mate 
selection.
C. Labor Force Discriminant Function
Specification of the decision to enter the labor force or remain 
at home follows traditional labor theory by including racial-cultural
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composition variables, income of both husband and wife, education, and 
transitory income payments. Non-economic determinants include measures 
of female responsibility in the home, various attitudinal variables re­
garding work preferences, marital stability and duration, and the respond­
ent's health.
The included variables and equation specification are detailed 
in equation (3.4) as:
LPRD = F^(Cq_5, LPRD_j , HWY, ED, PC, ATW, SOM,
SOMA, SOH, RD, WR, HATW) (3.4)
where LPRD = 0 - 1  dummy for labor force participation
Cq_2 = family responsibility defined as the number of 
children between the ages of 0 - 5 
LPRD_^ = labor force status in the previous year 
HWY = husband's wealth income 
PC = 1 if the wife has a professional certificate 
SOM = 0 - 1  dummy for stability of marriage
SOMA = duration of marriage
WR = hourly wage rate of woman
HATW = husband's attitude toward the wife's working
and the remaining variables are defined as before.
The two pure deterministic variables are the market wage rate 
and husband's wealth income; the former variable representing the mar­
ket's bid for the woman's services, and, as a proxy for time value, 
represents the cost of alternative uses of time (a substitution effect).
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Wealth income explains the necessity of female labor participation in 
order to obtain a given standard of living. The expected sign for the 
former variable is positive, while the latter variable can be either 
positive or negative depending upon whether labor force activity is a 
superior or inferior good.
Of the remaining variables, ATW, HATW, and HD measure the 
woman's preferences for work, the husband's reaction toward his wife's 
labor force participation, and whether a higher proportion of black women 
participate in labor force activities than white women. Though education 
continues to have an expected positive relationship with labor force 
activity, the presence of a professional certificate, PC, signifies the 
potential low return from human capital investment expenditures in 
higher education as a result of subsequent decisions to leave the labor 
force.
Although Cain popularized including family size as a determinant 
of labor force activity, recent work by Gregory demonstrated that a total 
family size variable is inadequate for reasons illustrated in Chapter I, 
section II, part C. The stock measure of family size is deficient 
because it assumes that the value of mother's time inputs per child are 
constant regardless of the age and number of children. Gronau's illus­
trations that because the peak time costs of children occur in the early 
stages of growth time costs of caring for children vary inversely with 
age and decline thereafter. Thus, any increase in the number of children 
between 0 - 5— a proxy for the maximum time input— raises the value of 
the mother's home production, and, therefore, reduces the probability of 
labor force participation.
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Finally, one of the unanswered questions in labor force studies
using aggregate data is the failure to measure individual labor force
movements over periods of time. As Ben Porath states, "With a 60% par­
ticipation rate in one year, the question is 'are the same 60% in the 
labor force the next year, or have some of the 40% not in the labor 
force replaced some of the workers in the labor force?' Consequently, 
considerable movements can take place in individual members of the labor 
force which is not shown in the aggregate data." By including the dummy 
variable for women in the labor force in the previous year, LPRD a 
positive coefficient less than 1 indicates the percentage of the current
labor force that was also in the labor force a year ago. Parameter esti­
mate approaching the 0.6 to 0.8 values calculated from aggregate data 
will substantiate Ben Porath's hypothesis that significant movements 
of the labor force occur each year_ which are not explained by aggregate 
data.
D. Hours Worked Equation
The hours worked determinants emphasize the costs and benefits 
accruing to an individual for working a certain number of hours given 
their physical capability and need to do so. Among the choice of deter­
minants of time spent at work are the variables detailed in equation
(3.5) as:
HW = Fg(WR, OTP, DOW, ICW, CC, PERY, ED, SOHH,
ATW , HW_j, RD) (3.5)
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where HW = usual number of hours worked per day
OTP = scaled variable of overtime pay schedule
DCW = direct cost of working as measured by transpor-^
tation and time cost of travelling to work per day
ICW = other costs of working per day
CC = daily child care costs
PERY = total wealth of family
and all other variables are defined as before.
The wage rate coefficient in the hours worked function will be 
positive when the income effect dominates and negative when the substi­
tution effect is preeminent. Though the backward bending labor supply 
schedule was originally developed for the primary labor force, Wachter's 
empirically derived conclusion that the inflexion point for the backward 
bending portion of the labor supply curve occurs at a relatively lower 
wage than the similar position for the primary labor force makes the 
issue equally important for secondary labor force analysis. As such, 
positive and negative coefficients are not only deemed possible, but a 
negative sign has a higher probability of occurring.
The second wage factor usually cited as a determinant of hours 
worked is the pay scale for overtime work. For individuals with similar 
socioeconomic conditions, the one who can avail himself of double time 
pay is expected to work more hours than the straighttime overtime 
recipient. Another monetary time worked determinant— originally sug­
gested by Barzel-McDonald and is proxied here by PERY— uses the family’s 
level of wealth to explain differential labor response patterns among
69
wives with equivalent attitudes and socioeconomic conditions. In essence, 
Barzel-McDonald argue that women possessing significant family assets or 
wealth have more flexibility in time spent at work owing to the economic 
security provided by their asset position. With a relatively secure base 
for preserving the family's needs, the woman can adjust her hours of work 
without having to worry about the possible ramifications of job loss.
She doesn't have to be a "job taker," but can pick and choose time re­
quirements that correspond to her preferences. The sign of PERY is inde­
terminant at this juncture because no empirical research has been per­
formed on the effects of family assets upon hours worked for the secondary 
labor force and because the theory merely acknowledges that the coeffi­
cient can bear any sign.
Perhaps the most significant failing of current labor supply 
empiricism is the absence of cost in the labor decision-making process. 
Currently, theoretical analysis of secondary labor force supply response 
functions emphasizes the corresponding benefits of working except to note 
that each hour of work represents an equivalent loss of leisure. Since 
participants in the labor force do incur monetary costs, failure to 
account for these costs in any cost-benefit calculations of labor force 
activity overstates the returns to working.
On the cost side three measures are specified: 1) the direct
cost work as measured by the actual cost of commuting to and from work;
2) the indirect or time cost of travel valued as time spent commuting, 
and 3) the daily cost of child care for women with children. Cost the­
ory suggests that increases in the cost of working are associated with
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a corresponding decrease in hours worked for all three variables. How­
ever, the backward bending supply curve's existence suggests that the 
sign could be reversed if the labor participant is operating on the 
negatively sloped portion of the labor supply curve. That is, an in­
crease in costs requires an increase in hours worked in order to recoup 
the expected monetary loss. If a net wage income is the relevant deter­
minant of hours worked, a rise in any of the three costs elicits a 
negative sign. The individuals apparently maintain net earnings by re­
ducing their work effort, or move to the right on the backward bending 
portion of their supply curve. When opposite signed coefficient occurs, 
the individuals can be placed on the positively sloped portion of the 
labor supply curve.
Of the remaining variables, education is included as a measure 
of the investment in human capital that alters preferences for work; 
state of health captures the constraints upon working imposed by phys­
ical limitations; attitude toward work represents psychological atti­
tudes toward labor force activity; and hours worked lagged one period 
captures the stability of the participant's work activity. The expected 
signs are positive for ED, ATW, and HW and negative for SOH.
E. Family Size Equation
Equation (3.6) defines the fertility as the stock of children 
ever borne in order to make better use of the information available in 
the National Longitudinal Survey data. The specification of fertility 
determinants follow past research plus the inclusion of psychological 
and new opportunity cost variables as detailed in equation (3.6);
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FS = Fg(ATK, WR, PERY, ED, EDM, ECC, AOM, #MK, RD) (3.6)
where FS = the number of children ever borne
#MK = // number of years between marriage and first child 
ECC = number of years of education anticipated for children 
AOM = age at first marriage 
and the remaining variables are defined as before. To prevent possible 
biassed results caused by incomplete families in the sample data, the 
data is limited to families where the woman is over 40 years of age or 
the youngest child is over 4 years old.
The wealth variable, PERY, in included to account for the posi­
tive income effect upon fertility. Permanent income is used in place of 
measured income for the same reasons that permanent rather than measured 
income is included as an argument "in the aggregate consumption function, 
i.e., a family's fertility decisions will be based more upon its esti­
mate of average income over a period of time rather than on current in­
come. Thus, a family with low-measured but relatively high permanent 
income is assumed to exhibit a fertility pattern which differs from a 
family with both low-measured and permanent income.
Inclusion of the wage rate variable represents one opportunity 
cost of rearing and caring for children. Cain argues that the "single 
most important price associated with children appears to be the price 
of the mother's time." The proxy for the value of time is an incomplete 
proxy for the opportunity cost of children because it ignores the neces­
sary time required to raise children of different ages. In spite of
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this deficiency the wage proxy is used in initial computations due to 
its popularity in the current literature and as a basis for evaluating 
the general time valuation procedure developed in the following chapter. 
Nevertheless, the wage rate valuation of time is accurate to the extent 
that the female's withdrawal from the labor force to bear and raise 
children involves a loss of income.
Other costs of children are measured in this model by the antic­
ipated number of years of education for all the children in the family. 
Although some of the burden of the educational expense is borne by the 
public sector, the family does invest their own time and money into the 
educational process. Therefore, the effect of raising the anticipated 
level of education upon family size is negative, ceteris paribus.
The inclusion of education is justified on the grounds that education 
will not only affect the family's jutility function concerning additions 
to the family, but also will affect the family's ability to enforce such 
decisions insofar as some education is generally required to acquaint 
oneself with and practice birth control techniques, especially in the 
absence of government sponsored educational programs. Educational 
levels of the male and female are separated for two reasons: 1) past
research has shown that female education is negatively related to fer­
tility, but the causality between male education and family size has yet 
to be ascertained, and 2) the existence of family disagreement over the 
"proper" family size could have a significant impact upon eventual fam­
ily size.
With respect to the effect of husband's education upon family
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size, the a priori reasoning suggests that higher education reduces the 
total number of children desired. However, the negatively signed coef­
ficient for female education is partially based upon the argument that 
more education reduces the preferences for children by increasing the 
woman's awareness of other possible activities foregone in the rearing 
process. In the man's case, more children may change his overall expend­
itures of time owing to his smaller time inputs in the child raising 
process. Instead, the father invests bulk time allotments by taking all 
of the family to the park, circus, show, or function the family desires. 
As such, higher levels of education for the male may produce a positive 
effect upon family size. Although this possibility does exist, empir­
ical settlement of the issue has yet to be obtained.
The woman's psychological attitude toward children determines 
the utility derived from her production of goods and services for their 
maintenance. Mothers with high preferences for children should be the 
ones who bear and rear a larger number of children to the extent that 
children are utility generating factors.
The age of marriage and the number of years after marriage that 
the first child was b o m  represent the tendency for couples who marry 
early to have larger families and couples who delay the arrival of their 
first child to have smaller families, respectively. In the former case 
the expected sign is positive, while the delay between marriage and child 
birth should be negative. The addition of these variables along with 
other non-economic variables provides a truer picture of the importance 
of economic variables in fertility determination.
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Finally, the race dummy tests the influence of racial factors 
upon family size. If black families have larger families, the coeffi­
cient of the dummy variable will be positive. While this approach is 
informative about racial differences, separate models for white and 
black samples are estimated in Chapter IV to determine how much informa­
tion is lost in the analysis of covariance approach.
IV. Empirical Results and Interpretation
Equation (3.1) and equations (3.3)-(3.6) are estimated by ordi­
nary least squares (OLS) in order to make the estimated results in the 
traditional model presented here comparable with previous empirical 
studies. A simultaneous equation estimation procedure was not adopted 
for two reasons. At a theoretical level, the theory developed in 
Chapter II, and given empirical content in Section III of the chapter, 
concerns decisions made by the individual over the course of, roughly, 
a twenty year time span. The decision to marry and choice of spouse 
occur in the late teens or early twenties for most individuals; labor 
force activity and hours worked involve yearly decisions; and the selec­
tion of the optimal family size is a decision that is made later in 
life. In essence, the "life-cycle" nature of the model developed here 
typifies Wold's arguments against simultaneous equation estimation pro­
cedures. At an empirical level, unpublished research by the Wharton 
macroeconometricians finds that the benefits to deriving consistent 
estimators has been overstated in the literature relative to the costs 
of obtaining them. The product of this line of research has been a 
return to the OLS form of estimation for many of the Wharton model 
equations.
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Following the line of reasoning discussed above, the parameter 
estimates, their significance level, a coefficient of multiple deter­
mination adjusted for degrees of freedom, F - statistic, and observa­
tions are presented for each equation. The results of the factor 
analysis used to construct the spouse quality index is excluded due to 
its lack of content for economic analysis. However, for the interested 
reader, the orthogonal rotation by the varimax criterion of the original 
factor leading matrix produced one factor that explained 91.3% percent 
of the variation, and each original variable had a high enough communal- 
ity with the factor to be considered part of that factor.
Contrary to time series analysis in which secular components in 
the data produce significant R^'s and aggregate cross-sectional data 
where reduced variability in the determined variable caused by the 
aggregation process leads to a high goodness-of-fit, the absence of
secular elements and more variability combine to produce lower coeffi-
2
cients of multiple determination. As such, published R 's using detailed
microeconomic data typically range in the neighborhood of 0.1 to 0.3
with occasional exceptions being found above 0.3. Based upon the findings
2
of studies using similar data, any specification that yields an R above
0.3 will be considered a good measurement of that variable's determinants.
A. Results
The empirical results for each equation and the level of signif­
icance for each parameter are presented below. In general the estimated 
parameters conform to the theory set forth in Section III, although some
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of the signs and significance tests fail to support some of the hypoth­
esis. Further, each equation has an of 0.3 or above, and the mar­
riage discriminant equation exceeds 0.6 while the hours worked equation 
reaches above 0.5. The high value of these evaluation parameters along 
with the significance levels supports an argument for reasonable 
equation specification.
MD = 0.852 • ATH + 0.527 • ATC + 0.016 • ATW - 0.02 • P15 
(0.06) (0.02) (0.010) (0.011)
+ 0.004 • L15 + 0.000003 • ED - 0.228 • RD + 0.894 
(0.011) (0.000011) (0.055) (0.489)
r 2 = 0.681 F-test = 60.14 N = 475 (3.7)
S = 0.109 • ED + 0.42 • ATW - 0.00002 • WY - 0.413 • SOH
(0.055) (0.06) (0.00005) (0.241)
+ 0.20 EDF + 0.001 FOC - 0.132 RD + 7.727
(0.09) (0.002) - (0.071) (1.303)
r 2 = 0.341 F-test = 21.40 N = 341 (3.8)
LFPRD = - 0.034 • - 0.0000132 • HPERY + 0.000390 • ED
(0.018) (0.0000089) (0.00960)
- 0.059 • PC 4- 0.132 • ATW + 0.023 • SOH + 0.037 • SOMA 
(0.068) (0.073) (0.017) (0.032)
- 0.0081 • SOH + 0.0078 • WR - 0.099 • HATW 
(0.0110) (0.0018) (0.029)
+ 0.134 • RD + 0.503 • LPD_j 
(0.05) (0.05)
r 2 = 0.476 F-test.= 28.09 . N = 499 (3.9)
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HW = 0.065 • WR + 0.011 • OTP - 0.01 • DCW + 0.0287 • ICW 
(0.011) (0.0007) (0.01) (0.0213)
- 0.043 • CC + 0.000002 • PERY - 1.67 • ED 
(0.021) (0.000055) (0.52)
- 0.047 • SOH - 0.323 • HATW + 0.638 • HW + 12.39 
(0.126) (0.131) (0.092) “ (6.94)
r 2 = 0.519 F-test = 21.57 N = 421 (3.10)
FS = 0.402 • ATC - 0.0018 • WR + 0.000016 • PERY 
(0.159) (0.0006) (0.0000071)
- 0.0009 • ED - 0.021 • EDM - 0.0798 • ECC 
(0.007) (0.021) (0.0075)
- 0.094 • AOM - 0.093 • //MK .+ 0.353 • RD + 4.70 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.190) (0.58)
r 2 = 0.43 F-test = 26.69 N = 353 (3.11)
As indicated, all of the equations yield estimators and a 
goodness-of-fit that surpass previous models using microeconomic cross- 
sectional data. A detailed discussion of each equation and its param­
eters begins in the next section.
B. Interpretation
Each equation discussion follows the order of their presentation
in Section III in order to maintain continuity.
I. Marital Equations
The attempt to differentiate between married and unmarried
2
women was the most successful equation as measured by the R value of
0.681 which indicates an unusually high degree of accuracy in the marital
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decision. Due to the absence of previous studies in this area, the 
signs and magnitudes of the parameter estimates cannot be compared 
against existing values; nevertheless, these results provide useful 
insights into the socio-psycho-economic variables that lead to house­
hold formation.
Among the novel variables to economic analysis of family forma­
tion— ATH, ATC, and ATW, the most significant psychological determinant 
of marriage is the woman's attitude toward children. In equation (3.7), 
the positive, significant value of 0.527 for ATC supports earlier argu­
ments that the association between child birth and marriage plays a 
major role in the decision to marry. The empirical interpretation of 
the parameter estimate is the expected value of the woman being married 
given that she has a positive preference for children. Thus, E(MD/ATC)
= 0.527 means any woman found to have a strong desire for children is 
expected to have a probability of 0.527 of also being married.
For ATH, the sign and 0.152 value suggests that women who re­
ceive benefits from performing the required home production duties have 
a higher probability of marriage than women who dislike household work. 
This result supports Becker’s contention that marriage is, in part, an 
attempt by the parties involved to realize the gains to specialization 
in those activities in which each has an economic advantage and/or pref­
erence for doing. However, the absolute value of the parameter, espe­
cially in relation to ATC, minimizes the overall ability of ATH to 
explain marriage. Finally, the ATW value of 0.16 shows that women with 
preferences for work apparently do not feel compelled to enter tKe
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marriage market, although the positive coefficient apparently indicates 
a willingness to view marriage and labor force activity as complementary 
goods.
One of the perplexing issues raised questions whether an indi­
vidual who enjoys housework, labor force activity, and caring for chil­
dren simultaneously is being logically consistent. Women apparently do 
possess a desire to participate in labor force functions and perform 
household chores concurrently. An alternative explanation can be found 
by applying a rough cost-benefit analysis to show that engagement in 
income maintenance and home production at the same time for the single 
person creates the potential for increasing their level of utility by 
specializing in those activities in which their comparative advantage 
exists.
In the case of the dummy variable for parents married or di­
vorced at age 15, P15, the coefficient indicates a 2% decrease in the 
probability of marriage when the individual's parents were not living 
together when at age 13. This is empirical support for the commonly 
held supposition that children from broken homes react to this expe­
rience by remaining single. The small value of thé estimate, -0.02, 
suggests that the net effect upon the marriage function is minimal.
With regard to the locational dummy, the positive sign means that non- 
urban dwellers have a higher probability of marriage for two reasons ;
I) parental and peer group pressures, and 2) the absence of economic 
condition’s that allow a female to be self-supporting in rural areas.
Finally, two variables, education and race dummy, complete the
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specification of the marriage discriminant equation. Education was orig­
inally theorized to increase the prospects of marriage by enhancing the 
individual’s preference for life with a member of the opposite six. How­
ever, the growth in a woman’s preference for marriage is partially offset 
by an increased awareness that viable alternatives to marriage do exist. 
These opposing forces are seen as the reason for the insignificant and 
small value of the educational variable.
The estimated effect of race upon the marriage discriminant 
function of -0.228 supports the theory that the generally lower economic 
status of black women forces them to associate with relatively lower 
status mates, ceteris paribus. Though this finding substantiates fur­
ther the overstatement of black responses to economic incentives from 
aggregate data, dummy variables still ignore the positive preference for 
marriage to members of the same race. The importance of this effect is 
measured in Chapter IV.
2. Spouse Equation
As expected from the explanation in Section III, the number of 
years of school completed, attitude toward work, education of father, 
and father’s occupation code possess the expected positive coefficients. 
Education, as a quality index, causes women with higher educational lev­
els to maximize the return on their investment in human capital by 
choosing mates with the economic capability to raise their standard of 
living. At the same time, education raises their expectations about 
the "perfect" mate. Another factor affecting human capital, health.
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makes women with health problems less efficient producers of home prod­
ucts; thus, they can expect a lower quality of spouse relative to the 
healthy individual. The other factor reducing spouse quality is the 
“0.228 value for the racial dummy. In spite of a priori arguments that 
racial-cultural groups interact in a positive manner, the quality meas­
urement of mates explains the negative sign of RD if black mates are 
characterized by a lower quality index. In light of the documented 
lower incomes, education, health, and overall economic status, the neg­
ative, significant coefficient seems plausible. One implication of this 
finding for policy purposes is the interrelationship between raising the 
economic status of black males and subsequent benefits to black females. 
To the extent that a wife gains from an increase in her husband's eco­
nomic conditions, future policies raising a black man's status will also 
benefit black women.
Two variables, EDF and FOC, are included to empirically test the 
hypothesis that some women mate with men possessing characteristics 
"like dear old dad." The educational level of the father and his occu­
pation combine to provide a rough proxy for the quality of the father. 
That is, a female child whose father is college educated and a profes­
sional worker is unlikely to choose a high school graduate, blue collar 
worker for a spouse. From the parameter estimates and their standard 
errors, education of the father does significantly affect the choice of 
mate, while father's occupation has almost no influence.
3. Labor Discriminant Equation
In the labor force discriminant function equation, the most
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significant variables are the number of children 0-5 years of age, the 
husband's stock measure of lifetime income, the race dummy variable, 
and labor force participation lagged one period. A formal discussion 
of the statistically insignificant variables is foregone in order to 
illustrate the importance of the dominant variables in the equation. 
Perhaps the major unsettled issue first raised by Ben Porath questions 
conclusions based upon aggregate labor force data that 60-80% of the 
women in the previous year's labor force are also in the next year's 
labor force. The coefficient of 0.503 for LPRD  ^ in equation (3.9) 
suggests that these values overestimate the stability of the secondary 
labor force in general, and at best represent a lower bound to their 
actual labor force mobility.
The significance of this result for secondary labor force anal­
ysis raises doubts the applicability of primary labor force procedures 
to study the determinants of women in the labor force. If the secondary 
labor force retained 70% of its workers from year to year, as the aggre­
gate suggested, the labor force would be displaying enough stability to 
justify use of a uniform set of procedures. However, with almost half 
of the women in the labor force turning over every year, the secondary 
labor force appears to be composed of two distinct types: one group
which responds to the same economic forces as the primary labor force 
activity, and a second group which responds to temporary economic condi­
tions. In short, current secondary labor force research mistakenly 
assumes that women, especially married women, by virtue of their gender 
and marital status, can be treated as workers who respond to a different
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set of determinants than primary labor force members. These results 
demonstrate the error in failing to recognize that many women (almost 
50%) can be considered part of the primary labor force as a result of 
their stable participation.
The husband's stock of wealth and the wage rate represent the 
need to enter the labor force and the opportunity cost of not working, 
respectively. The strong support for Cq ^ (-0.034) reflects Cain’s 
finding that family size was not a binding constraint upon labor force 
activity due to the negative, but insignificant, coefficient between 
labor force activity. The discrepancy in the findings arises from a 
difference in determining exactly how family responsibilities restrain 
labor force activity. Whereas Cain views total family size as the 
major factor, the arguments set forth in the previous two chapters sug­
gest that children of different ages impose different time costs upon 
the mother. That is, to the extent that pre-school children require 
more direct and constant aid in performing their daily routine than 
older children, the greater opportunity cost of working— separation from 
their children— for the younger age groups supports the negative, signif­
icant coefficient. In defense of Cain's position,'he was the first to 
empirically test the proposition that family demands affect the supply 
of secondary laborers.
4. Hours Worked Equation
The results of the hours worked equation are informative from 
the focal point of the equation itself, and to compare with the determi­
nants of the decision to enter the labor force. Though the signs of the
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traditional variables— wage rate, education, and income— conform to a 
priori expectations the most interesting results in equation (3.10) are 
the indirect cost of work, child care cost, and the husband's attitude 
toward the wife working. The most significant of these variables, HATW, 
suggests by virtue of sign and magnitude that women attach a significant 
weight to their husband's attitudes toward her working in deciding upon 
how many hours to work. This finding is empirical support for the logic 
of the theoretical model derived in Section II that application of the 
Samuelson-Stolper theorems to the "new home economics" incorrectly 
assumes independence among the individual family member's utility levels. 
Instead, they are very much interconnected. As expected, the a priori 
feeling that family utility functions are interdependent warrants future 
research designed to develop a family utility maximization model in 
which this interaction is formally explained.
Of the cost variables, child care is largest in magnitude and 
more significant than the other. A unit increase in the cost of child 
care elicits a -0.043 unit decline in the number of hours worked per day. 
Clearly, working women reduce the level of their labor force activity 
when the net benefits to working are reduced via higher prices in the 
cost of working. A baby sitter can reduce the net gain from working by 
raising the cost portion of the profit maximizing behavior function. The 
positive, moderately significant coefficient for the indirect cost of 
working variable will seem incongruous until one realizes that the indi­
rect cost of working— defined as the amount of time required to reach 
the place— can be minimized by working longer hours. For this reason.
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the positive coefficient of 0.0287 for ICW apparently represents an 
attempt to reduce the impact of the opportunity cost of commuting upon 
their net monetary gains from working by working longer hours.
For comparative purposes, the relative magnitudes and signifi­
cance levels between the decision to enter work and hours worked illus­
trate the importance of differentiating between the two decisions. Note 
that in the LPRD equation, the dominant statistical factors are pri­
marily the variables that restrict the labor supply functions— the 
number of preschool children (Cq , the economic need to participate 
in labor activity (HPERY), and the labor market's valuation of the 
woman's time (WR). Selection of hours worked depends heavily upon the 
costs incurred in working. The different response patterns in each 
equation to the socioeconomic determinants illustrate Tobin's original 
argument for a significant nonlinearity in the household decision­
making process. Chapter IV elaborates upon this problem in greater 
detail.
5. Fertility Equation
Except for the inclusion of the attitudinal variable, ATC and 
the proxy for direct commodity cost of children, ECC, the stock of 
children equation conforms to previous fertility equation specifica­
tions. Among the usually included variables, the positive, significant 
family wealth coefficient contradicts the assertions of Venieris, et al., 
that children are an inferior commodity. Likewise, the wage rate proxy 
for the opportunity cost of children and education, as an indicator of 
alternative tastes for children plus the technical capability to follow
86
through with family desires, display the postulated negative signs. 
Finally, women who marry early in life are seen to bear a larger number 
of children than women who marry later, ceteris paribus.
The impact of psychological factors upon the number of children 
ever borne bears a positive sign along with a highly significant coef­
ficient. The importance of the inclusion of attitudinal variables 
manifests itself in the over-statement of the magnitude of economic 
variables— income and opportunity costs in specific. As the students 
approaching fertility determination from a sociological perspective have 
long argued, specification of family size determinants entirely with 
economic variables requires a ceteris paribus assumption that women have 
exactly the same preferences for children. Becker proposes the same 
approach in a roundabout manner by noting that one difference between 
the observed income effect upon chj.ldren and the "true" income effect 
flows from the absence of psychological variables in economic studies 
of fertility. The empirical results in equation (3.11) support the com­
bined works of Ryder and others in sociology and Becker in economics to 
the extent that the income parameters reported here are smaller than 
previous single equation estimates.
To illustrate the importance of excluding attitudes toward 
children, equation (3.11) is recomputed without ATC, and presented below 
in equation (3.11a) as:
FS = -0.0026'WR + 0.000034'PERY - 0.0095'ED + 0.014'EDM 
(0.0006) (0.000018) (0.009) (0.0016)
- 0.08'ECC - 0.095*AOM - 0.094*#MK + 0.310'RD + 5.17 
(0.007) (0.019) (0.024) (0.190) (0.56)
r 2 = 0.376 F-test = 22.13 N = 353 (3.11a)
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As predicted, both the income effect (PERY) and substitution effect (WR) 
parameters increase in value relative to their magnitudes in equation 
(3.11). That is, economic determinants of fertility alone overstate the 
reaction of parental fertility decisions to economic influences.
A second issue initially raised by Barzel-McDonald questions the 
use of total family income to represent income. Instead of a total in­
come measure their argument favors separating total income into human 
capital and net asset income. In specific, income aggregation disguises 
the hypothesized greater importance of net assets over human capital in 
the selection of family size. To empirically test the relative magni­
tudes of the income measures, PERY in equation (3.11) is divided into 
human capital wealth— HWY, and equivalent measure for the wife— WWY, and 
family net assets— NA. The reestimated equation is:
FS = 0.309'WAC - 0.00133'WR + 0.0000088'HWY 
(0.168) (0.0007) (0.0000062)
- 0.00000385*WWY + 0.0099'ED - 0.025'EDM - 0.078"ECC 
(0.00000216) (0.0394) (0.021) (0.007)
- 0.094-A0M - 0.093*//MK - 0.00000068'NA + 0.368'RD + 4.82 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.00000054) (0.19) (0.59)
r 2 = 0.438 F-test = 27.31 ' N = 353 (3.11b)
The specific argument for the dominance of net assets in family fertil­
ity decisions remains unsupported by virtue of its smaller magnitude and 
significance relative to the human wealth measures.
Of the remaining variables in equation (3.11), the parents' de­
sired level of education for the children can be viewed as one cost of
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children. As a proxy for child quality the negative, significant rela­
tionship simultaneously supports the position that attempts to raise the 
quality of children necessitates the reduction in family size, ceteris 
paribus, and suggests that Becker errs in believing that children are 
inferior commodities. Rather, the income elasticity of demand is found 
to be positive when costs are formally measured.
Finally, the race dummy variable shows the expected increase in 
family size associated with cultural differences. Whether the observed 
discrepancy among family size is attributable to differential tastes for 
children between black-white families or to variations in economic fac­
tors cannot be completely ascertained until the samples are divided in 
Chapter IV.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Although the estimations presented in equations (3.7) through 
(3.11b) add to our knowledge regarding the interaction of various social 
science determinants in the household decision-making process, the re­
sults are constrained because of the need to maintain the comparability 
of these finds with existing studies. The present results provide in­
formation about many issues currently in dispute. In general, the impor­
tance of psychological attitudes to equation specifications, the added 
knowledge that follows from disaggregating the income variable, and the 
importance of considering costs are demonstrated in both the fertility 
equation and labor force equation. Because the absence of alternative 
studies prevents comparisons with the marriage market and spouse equa­
tion, the results are evaluated in relation to the theoretical literature,
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The main finding disputes the assumption that individual family member 
utility functions are completely independent by finding a significant 
interaction between individual decisions and the attitudes of other 
family members.
Three questions remain to be answered: 1) the error, if any, in
wage rate time valuation, 2) the magnitude of black-white demand re­
sponse differentials, and 3) the usefulness of ordinary least squares 
estimation. The result of subsequent modifications will be shown to 
enhance our understanding of the household decision-making process.
CHAPTER IV
ESTIMATION OF THE GENERAL TIME VALUE MODEL
I. Introduction 
Criticisms of the traditional model estimations in Chapter III 
focus upon the failure of wage rates to accurately measure the value of 
time for nonworkers (an understatement) and for workers alike (an over­
statement) and the failure of OLS estimation of nonlinearities inherent 
in the household decision-making models. Specifically, a nonworking 
woman's time value can be shown to differ from her labor force wage rate 
by observing (almost tautologically) that the woman would participate in 
the labor force if her market time value exceeded her home time value. 
But the woman, by opting for household production activities, signifies 
that the wage inducement to labor force activity is insufficient rela­
tive to the costs incurred. Therefore, the wage rate proxy understates 
the nonworking woman's value of time.
Like the assault upon a nonworking woman's time value, Johnson 
and De Serpa attack the wage rate valuation of time for workers. De 
Serpa's criticism follows from his inclusion of a substitution effect 
between time and goods in the household production constraint. That is, 
incorporation of a substitution effect produces a theory of time that 
rests upon hours worked and overtime pay schedules as well as the wage 
rate. For example, two individuals earning exactly the same wage with
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one working 40 hours per week and the other 60 hours per week will not 
have the same time value unless the marginal utility of money is con­
stant. Further, overtime payments between the two individuals will pro­
duce deviations in wage payments that the common wage proxy fails to 
take into consideration. According to both authors, the effect of the 
wage rate proxy is the overstatement of time value.
The second issue in current empirical studies of the household 
decision-making process questions the ability of OLS estimation to ex­
plain household demand. The OLS estimation procedure is believed to 
produce biassed results when a dichotomous decision is explained with 
continuous variables in a single step. An example is the decision to 
enter the labor force and how many hours to work if labor force partici­
pation is accepted.
The first technique suggested as a replacement was the twin 
linear probability approach (TLP) developed by the social science re­
search center at the University of Michigan. Although an improvement, 
some problems that remain motivated Tobin to develop an alternative one 
step extension of probit analysis that yields a nonnegative, maximum 
likelihood estimate of the coefficients and population variance. Since 
neither approach has achieved preeminence in the statistics, both are 
applied to the black-white equations to test their predictive powers.
Section II elaborates upon the value of time measure to be con­
structed, and discusses in greater detail the strengths and weaknesses 
of the estimated equations for the separate black-white samples. In 
Section IV the results are summarized.
92
II. A General Framework 
In part A of this section a general valuation of time equation 
is developed that incorporates the criticisms of the aggregate wage 
rate approach into one measure of time value. Part B compares the the­
oretical properties of the TLP and Tobit techniques.
A. Value of Time
In accordance with the criteria for valuing nonworker's time by 
the "reservation wage," and worker's time as a combination of hours 
worked plus overtime pay rates in conjunction with the normal wage rate 
proxy leads to the dual function specified in equation (4.1):
RW ; if not in labor force
V = F,
^ WR X HW + 0 X WR X HM - OT(Q) . labor force
OT(0) OTC0)
C4.1)
where RW = reservation wage in dollars and cents
WR = wage rate in dollars and cents 
HW = hours worked per week
OT = hours of work required before overtime pay commences 
0 = the overtime payment rate, for example, 0 = 0 if
single time, 0.5 if time and a half overtime, and
1 if double time.
Data on the reservation wage is obtained directly from the NLS survey.
The reservation wage represents the individual's perception of their
actual time value and is not an imputed value from estimated wage
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equations. An objection to survey information of this type correctly 
argues that the individual might be able to command a wage in excess of 
their reservation wage by searching all of the potential markets for 
their services. To evaluate this position search and information costs 
would have to be quantified. Nevertheless, individuals base their deci­
sions upon their known market values, not unknown market worth. As 
such, the reservation wage provides observation on the individual's 
evaluation of the worth of his own time, and this is what the theory of 
time purports to be concerned with.
The determination of time value for workers can also be taken 
from NLS data directly. The general value of time measure constructed 
depends upon the wage rate, hours worked, and overtime pay rate as well 
as the number of hours of work required before overtime.pay is applicable. 
Because Becker introduces wage rate time valuation within the context of 
an institutionally determined 40 hour week and no overtime, equation (4.1) 
will reduce to wage rate time valuation when HW = 40, and OT(0) = 40, 
HW/OT(0) = 40/40 = 1 and [HW - OT(0)]/OT(0) = (40 - 40/40) = 0, or 
= WR. The same result holds for secondary and part-time laborers who 
may not have the option of working the assumed 40 hours per week.
An example of the greater flexibility built into can be seen 
from the example two hypothetical workers— one person who works less 
than 40 hours per week and one who works more than 40 hours per week. 
Allowing for complete freedom in choice of hours worked, the former rep­
resents a "work to live" attitude and the latter a "live to work" ap­
proach toward life. Letting HW^ = 20 in the first instance and HW^ =» 60
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in the latter, assuming equal wages (WR = $5.00/hr), equal overtime pay 
scales ( 0 = 0  for straighttime), and the same required number of hours 
required for overtime pay [OT(0) = 40], the first employee values his 
working time at = 5.00 (20/40) + 0 x 5.00 (20 - 40/40) = $2.50; or 
time is valued at 1/2 the actual wage rate. The latter individual pos­
sesses an opportunity cost of = 5.00 (60/40) + 0 = $7.50. In this 
instance and in cases where individuals face different values for 0, 
wage rate time valuation fails to provide a close approximation to a 
person's time cost.
Studies of primary labor force participants may not be completely 
invalid owing to the institutionally imposed rigidities in the labor mar­
ket, but the greater variation in time worked by the secondary labor 
force dictates a more flexible measurement of time value.
B . The Twin Linear Probability and Tobit Approaches
The first solution for handling the dual decision-making process 
in microeconomic survey data developed by the social science researchers 
at the University of Michigan uses two OLS equation estimations— one for 
the dichotomous or 0-1 variable and the second for predicting the con­
tinuous variable. For any given decision the initial step is deciding 
to buy, y = 0, or not to buy, y = 1, and then following up on the 
decision-making process if y = 1 in the first step. In essence, the 
second decision only occurs when the initial decision is to buy, or, 
likewise, the second is conditional upon the first.
Since predicting the purchase level of the pertinent dependent 
variable is the purpose of this analysis, the expected value of Y is 
derived by finding the intersection between the two equations by noting 
that EY = EY*F(Y) = F(Y>0) • E{Y*[f(Y|Y>0)]} = Prob {Y>0}'E(Y|Y>0).
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A current alternative coming into vogue is the extension of 
probit analysis by James Tobin which develops an index, I, that conforms 
to the standard zero mean and constant variance assumptions by specify­
ing each dependent observation as a function of the determining vari­
ables via the index number I. Using maximum likelihood estimation 
procedures based upon the likelihood function described in Tobin’s origr- 
inal article, the estimated expectation of the dependent variable is 
determined by * F(I^/a) + a • F(I^/o), which is necessarily non­
negative.
Acceptance of one approach over the other will depend upon the 
ability to prove that one provides better forecasts at a smaller cost 
in time and effort. Though the theoretical advantage of Tobit is its 
assurance that the predicted values will conform to the nonnegative 
bounds assumed in the model, this potential advantage is partly offset 
by the increased computer costs in core requirements and the extra
By finding the expected value from the first OLS equation, EYj = Y ’, 
and the expected value in the second OLS equation, EYg = Y ’’, then EY 
is computed by multiplying the two expected values, EY = Y ’ % Y ’’.
The major documented weaknesses of the TLP involved in the first 
equation is the possibility of violating the homoscedasticity assumption 
since defining Y^ as a 0-1 variable, the residual of = Y^^ - X ’*3 
must be either -X'*g when Y^^ = 0 or 1 - X^'g when Y^^ = 1. In order
for to have the expected value of zero, its distribution must be 
-X^ when F(e^) = 1 - X'*g and 1 - X^«g when = X^*g. Because of the
likelihood that these conditions will not be met, a costly generalized 
least squares approach (GLS) is required. But even if a GLS procedure 
is applied, EY^ can still fall outside the defined 0-1 bounds, which is 
inconsistent with the definition of Y and with its interpretation as a 
probability measure. Compounding the heteroscedasticity problem in the 
words of Goldberger is, "the procedure does not directly attempt to fit 
EY to Y, it takes no explicit account of the estimation of EY by 
EY = Y ’"Y’’ . . ." and this statement sums to the need for an alterna­
tive estimation procedure.
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costs in iterating the solution from the basic likelihood function. 
Further, the criticism against TLP merely acknowledges the possibility 
that EY might fall outside the bounds set up by the model. If TLP pro­
duces expected values which conform to the required bounds and forecasts 
as accurately as Tobin's procedure (referred to as Tobit analysis), 
then the extra expense Incurred In the Tobit procedure may not justify 
Its use.
Like any untested procedure, the absence of published empirical 
comparisons of Tobit with alternative methods prevents a priori asser­
tions about their relative efficiencies. The results reported here will 
take a step toward reducing the uncertainty surrounding the predictive 
capabilities of Tobit versus the TLP procedure.
III. Empirical Results
Because the equations and their specifications are discussed at 
length In Chapter III, the rationale for specific formulations are not 
repeated. However, one major change replaces the standard wage rate 
time value measure (WR) with the general time value proxy (V^). Each 
equation Is estimated and Interpreted for both the "black-white samples 
and compared to the results gathered from the traditional models.
Though specific details await evaluation of Individual equations, the 
overall results are threefold; one, more detailed insights Into black- 
white household demand formation Is obtained by separating the cultures 
Into two samples; second, Tobit analysis consistently outperforms TLP on 
statistical grounds; and third, wage rate time valuation measurement
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errors are demonstrated to be significant for both blacks and whites in 
all equations.
Individual equation results are presented in Tables 4.1 through 
4.6. Each table details the parameter estimates and their significance 
levels. The white sample calculations are in the odd numbered tables 
and those for the black sample in the even numbered tables. Besides 
providing the TLP and Tobit results, OLS results are also included to 
compare the alternative estimation procedures. Because Tobin has demon­
strated the statistical inaccuracies of OLS within a nonlinear demand 
process, the OLS results are not discussed.
A. Marriage Equations
The signs and magnitudes of the white sample coefficients re­
semble those in equations (3.7) and (3.8). However, both the signs and 
magnitudes in the black equations change significantly. This finding 
suggests that the intercept analysis of covariance approach fails to 
adequately explain black demand differences. Although the degree of 
coefficient error is minimal for whites, the extent of error introduced 
for the minority component of the population sample will be illustrated 
below.
1. Black-White Equation and Individual Equation Differences
The separate cultural equations provide more detailed informa­
tion about variation in the dependent variable than the analysis of 
covariance results in the traditional model. More importantly for 
policy purposes, black-white responses to the marriage and spouse
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TABLE 4.1
WHITE MARRIAGE EQUATIONS
Exogenous
Variables
Endogenous Variables
Twin Linear Probability Tobit OLS
MD S MB'S MB'S
1. ATH 0.90**** 0.07*** 0.63**** 1.26**
2. ATC 0.632**** 0.13** 0.61*** 1.20***
3. ATW -0.134*** -0.071** -0.114*** -0.228***
4. P15 -0.02** —0.06** -0.02* 0.4**
5. L15 0.04** -0.0003 0.0113 0.022**
6. ED -0.0003** 0.211*** 0.179*** 0.34****
7. WY —0.06** 0.0002** -0.0063*** -0.0136***
8. SOH -0.02** —0.3*** -0.012* -0.02**
9. EOF 0.213** 0.07* 0.093* 0.177**
10. FOG 0.144*** 0.037** 0.089** 0.199****
11. CON 0.90 0.32 0.64 0.54***
r 2 0.694 0.49 0.67 0.53
N 350. 290. 350. 350.
F-test 26.22 21.44 22.16
MSE 0.21 1.02 1.33 1.27
****
***
**
Significant at 
Significant at 
Significant at
1%
5%
10%
* Significant at 15%
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TABLE 4.2
BLACK MARRIAGE EQUATIONS
Exogenous
Variables
Endogenous Variables
Twin Linear Probability Tobit OLS
MD S MD'S MD'S
1. ATH 0.387*** 0.005** 0.096*** 0.2**
2. ATC 0.213** 0.114** 0.207*** 0.419***
3. ATW 0.133*** 0.097** 0.110*** 0.220*
4. P15 0.07** -0.13* 0.01** 0.019*
5. L15 0,011*** -0.006* 0.007*** 0.016**
6. ED 0.114**** 0.144*** 0.133*** 0.297
7. WY 0.08** 0.0001 0.00632*** 0.0126*
8. SOH —0.06*** -0.54** -0.132** —0.264***
9. EOF 0.132** 0.09** 0.127** 0.254**
10. FOG 0.093*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.0173*
11. CON 0.776 1.14 0.934 0.185***
r2 0.712 0.44 0.633 0.49
N 125. 91. 125. 125.
F-test 26.41 18.76 16.74
MSE 0.37 1.97 1.63 1.69
***
**
Significant at 
Significant at 
Significant at
1%
5%
10%
* Significant at 15%
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TABLE 4.3 
WHITE LABOR FORCE EQUATIONS
Exogenous
Variables
Endogenous Variables
Twin Linear Probability Tobit OLS
LFPD HW LFPD'HW LFPD'HW
1. Co_5 -0.062**** -0.851* -0.435**** -1.01**
2. HPERY -0.062** 0.38*** —0.04*** -0.2**
3. ED -0.0036 -0.216* -0.021 —0.57***
4. PC -0.0021 -3.04** -0.245 -1.9
5. ATW 0.021** 1.006*** 0.138*** 0.53
6. SOHW -0.014** -0.671*** -0.019 -0.09
7. HW , 
-1
0.015**** 0.242**** 0.062**** 0.544****
8. HAW 0.0116 —2.86**** 0.187** 1.11*
9. DCW -0.00067**** -0.04 -0.0026**** -0.004
10. ICW -0.0028**** -0.056**** -0.337**** -0.271****
11. Vj. -0.0014**** 0.098**** -0.0157**** 6.12****
12. NA -0.0025*** -0.028 -0.015**** f"0.094****
13. CON 0.031 16-27*** -1.40* 5.67
r 2 0.69 0.587 0.68 0.82
N 187. 85. 187. 187.
F-test 35.73 21.58 71.57
MSE 0.278 6.005 14.23 8.10
****
***
**
Significant at 
Significant at 
Significant at
1%
5%
10%
* Significant at 15%
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TABLE 4.4 
BLACK LABOR FORCE EQUATIONS
Exogenous
Variables
Endogenous Variables
Twin Linear Probability Tobit OLS
LFPD HW LFPD'HW LFPD'HW
^0-5 0.015** -0.009* 0.067* -0.409
2. HPERY 0.0177*** 0.11* 0.064*** 0.156
3. ED 0.0125* -0.033 0.058 -0.35*
4. PC 0.162*** -2.135** 0.465 -0.19
5. ATW 0.016* 0.14 0.074 0.42
6. SOHW -0.0089* -0.546 -0.041* -0.24
7. HW_j 0.016**** 0.359**** 0.077**** 0.615****
8. HAW 0.021 0.669*** 0.132* 0.66
9. DCW 0.00044*** 0.0026** 0.0021**** 0.002
10. ICW 0.00343**** -0.0122*** 0.681**** —0.841****
11. -0.00232 0.0569*** -0.0104*** 6.71****
12. NA -0.011* —0.24*** -0.06**** -0.617****
13. CON -0.533**** 25.41**** -3.129**** -0,24
r 2 0.6382 0.477 0.599 0.898
N 88. 59. 88. 88.
F-test 18.80 15.08 64.34
MSE 0.28 5.02 6.34 5.71
****
***
**
Significant at 
Significant at 
Significant at
1%
5%
10%
* Significant at 15%
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TABLE 4.5
WHITE FERTILITY EQUATIONS
Exogenous
Variables
Endogenous Variables
Twin Linear Probability Tobit OLS
CD FS CD'FS CD'FS
1. V, —0.0074*** -0.003** -0.00016*** -0.101**
2. ED -0.005*** -0.1367**** 0.081 —0.116****
3. EDH -0.003* —0.099**** -0.0743**** -0.065***
4. ECC 0.0251 -0.0132** 0.006
5. ATC 0.038*** -0.052*** -0.150** 0.114
6. NA -0.53*** -2.89* -0.365** 0.0
7. HWY 0.2** 0.6** 0.174* -0.00115
8. WWY -0.06 -6.12**** -3.82*** -0.00593****
9. ACM -0.013**** 0.0054 -0.0563**** —0.124****
10. //MG -0.0369**** —0.01***
11. CON 0.715**** 1.892**** 0.824**** 4.58****
r 2 0.7102 0.21 0.644 0.2664
N 275. 250. 275. 275.
F-test 74.10 6.79 11.41
MSE 0.43 1.98 1.47 1.31
****
***
**
Significant at 
Significant at 
Significant at
1%
5%
10%
* Significant at 15%
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TABLE 4.6
BLACK FERTILITY EQUATIONS
Endogenous Variables
Exogenous
Variables
Twin Linear Probability Tobit OLS
CD FS CD'FS CD'FS
0.0001 -0.005*** —0.857**** -0.213*
2. ED -0.022*** -0.109** -0.0156** -0.067
3. EDH -0.0003 -0.023 -0.0437* -0.064
4. ECC -0.0549** -0.0833** -0.069
5. ATC 0.095*** 1.023*** 0.853**** 0.8778****
6. NA -1.9* -4.3**** —4.31*** -0.028**
7. HWY -0.24* 6.5*** 0.446*** -0.0055
8. WWY -0.13* 0.27* -0.93 0.0038
9. ADM 0.00053*** —0.008*** —0.589*** -0.153****
10. #MC -0.049*** -0.1033
11. CON 0.517**** 3.59*** 0.462 5.76****
R2 0.706 0.312 0.70 0.5013
N 89. 64. 89. 89.
F-test 17.15 12.62 7.59
MSE 0.185 1.31 1.61 1.37
***
**
Significant at 
Significant at 
Significant at
1%
5%
10%
* Significant at 15%
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selection determinants are significantly different. The attitudinal co­
efficients— ATH, ATC, and ATW— for white women correspond closely with 
the traditional model in the first two cases, and have the negative sign 
expected from the traditional model in the attitude toward work variable. 
In the latter category, white women with preferences for work substitute 
labor force activity in place of household maintenance activities. From 
Table 4.2, the cause of the positive sign in equation (3.7) is the 
strong positive preference among blacks for working in the labor force 
and at home concurrently. This difference indicates the information 
loss caused by the failure to account for the slope differences between 
cultures. For example, the combined equation specifications in equation 
(3.7) overstates the magnitude and predicts the wrong sign for the white 
marital response to ATW, i.e., 0.90 - 0.134 = 0.766 in Table 4.1 versus
0.894 + 0.016 = 0.90 in equation (3.7). The corresponding figures for 
blacks are 0.894 - 0.228 + 0.016 = 0.682 versus 0.7764 + 0.133 = 0.9009. 
In both cases the traditional equation inadequately explains the racial 
decision-making process for policy analysis.
Other significant coefficient deviations between races are edu­
cation, wage income, and parental marital status at age 15. In each 
case the white woman reduces her probability of marriage as the respec­
tive variables increase while the black female reacts positively. Poli­
cies designed to increase women’s educational levels reduce household 
formation among white women and raise it for black women. These altera­
tions in the basic family formation process can have extensive ramifica­
tions upon the total secondary labor force and family size decisions to
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the extent that marriage allows the participants to specialize in their 
most efficient activity. Since marriage does influence both decisions, 
effective policy analysis depends upon understanding the major differ­
ences between racial reactions to deterministic variables.
Though the effect of wage income upon marriage varies between 
races, the primary sociological difference in racial marital decision­
making is in parent's marital status. White women with divorced or 
separated parents have a lower probability of marriage than black women. 
In the former situation, the woman apparently reacts to the unsettled 
parental situation by remaining single. At the same time the black 
female attempts to escape from a similar situation through formation of 
her own household. The significant coefficients in both samples pro­
vides preliminary support for the sociological explanation of household 
formation.
In the spouse quality selection equation, the only significant 
sign difference among the racial samples is a reduction in spouse quality 
when the preference for work increases for white women and an increase 
in quality for a black woman with a similar attitude. Given the distinc­
tive economic and social patterns between the races, white women with 
work preferences cannot gain access to the apparent higher status white 
males who prefer a "stay at home" wife. Higher status black men seem to 
prefer women with an affinity for labor force participation— perhaps as 
a means of increasing the family's prestige or maybe as a means to in­
crease their social mobility, but certainly a black woman enhances her 
potential husband status by remaining in the labor force.
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In addition to the black-white responses to marriage determi­
nants, a second advantage to the twin linear probability approach de­
rives from insights into the dual nature of the decision-making process; 
The first to marry or remain single, and the second is choice of spouse. 
The value of separating the two steps can be seen by comparing the nega­
tive, slightly significant coefficients for education and wage income in 
the marriage discriminant equation with the opposite signed and signifi­
cant coefficients for the same variables in the spouse quality equation.
As explained previously, higher educated and wage earning white women 
have a lower probability of marriage, but marry higher quality men if 
they do marry. Black women, on the other hand, have a higher probabil­
ity of marriage and spouse quality for each variable.
2. Tobit and TLP Compared
For the TLP black-white equations where both coefficients in the 
marriage discriminant equation and spouse equations have the same sign, 
the corresponding Tobit coefficient bears a like sign. For the opposite 
signed TLP estimates on ED and WY, the positive signed education and 
negative signed income variables in Tobit signify dominance by spouse 
selection and marriage discriminant equations, respectively. With re­
gard to coefficient magnitudes and significance levels, the Tobit coef­
ficients lie between the two TLP coefficients. Because comparison of 
the signs and significance levels between the two estimation procedures 
fails to produce major differences, the discussion shifts to the relative 
costs and benefits of each approach. The major questions to be answered 
are the relative time costs of running the programs, forecasting accuracy.
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and knowledge gained from the estimation procedures.
The commonly cited advantage accruing to the Tobit approach is 
subsequent failure of OLS in the discriminant equation to keep the pre­
dicted values or probability of marriage in the 0-1 range. If the OLS 
coefficients produce an estimated value for MD (MD) that is less than 0, 
say -1.0, or greater than 1, say 1.5, the estimated value's standard 
interpretation as a probability of marriage becomes untenable and there­
fore useless. Tobit analysis satisfied the claims of its founder by 
yielding expected values within the bounds set up in both samples, i.e., 
no predicted values were less than the 0 lower bound. In contrast the 
TLP method produced expected values outside of this range in 5% of the 
cases for the white sample and 1.3% in the black group. Inconsistency 
in TLP favors the Tobit estimation procedure. In essence, nonlinear 
estimation of the nonlinear decision-making process afforded more accu­
rate expected values than the TLP procedure.
Supporting the Tobit method's ability to constrain the expected
values within the bounds specified by the marriage equation is the
smaller value of its forecasting error. Using the mean square error
(MSE) criteria, the residuals from Tobit analysis yielded a MSE of 1.36
and 1.63 for the white and black samples as reported in Tables 4.1 and
4.2 respectively. Equivalent values are reported for the OLS estimates
of TLP in the same tables. Due to the nonlinearities in the equations,
/> ^
the appropriate expected values is determined by MD'S instead of the 
sum of each equation separately. After making the conversions defined 
above MSE values for the TLP equations of 2.97 and 4.22 are found for
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the respective samples. Once again, transformation of the nonlinear 
process into two linear decisions fails to match the Tobit procedure 
for ex post forecasting accuracy.
Offsetting the purely statistical advantages of Tobit analysis 
are the added time costs in computation and the information lost re­
garding the relative importance of the determining variables in the 
decision-making process. For time costs, the roughly one to one and 
a half minutes required to estimate each Tobit equation relative to the 
five to ten seconds needed for each TLP equation may prove prohibitive 
for users with few computer funds or slower computers.
The value of knowing the relative weights attached to the deci­
sion to enter the marriage market and spouse selection equations depends 
upon the extent to which the two decisions are expected to produce di­
vergent results and the importance of these differences for subsequent 
analytical procedures. Consistency of signs within the black sample 
coefficients suggests no advantage attributable to the TLP approach.
But, the opposite signed education and wage income variables in the 
white sample exhibits information about the decision-making process 
which adds to our knowledge about the household decision-making process.
The marriage equation results support Tobins's approach on purely 
statistical grounds, but at the expense of added time costs and informa­
tion lost. Deciding upon the proper methodology depends upon computer 
time availability and the importance of knowing the determining vari­
ables differential effects on the discriminant and quantity decisions.
A compromise solution for researchers without time constraints is appli­
cation of both methodologies.
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B. Labor Force Equations
Because this study focuses upon time valuation as an important 
determinant of labor force decision-making, is discussed separately 
from the rest of the variables in order to emphasize the failings of 
wage rate time valuation.
1. The Value of Time
Both the white and black sample results in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 
confirm Gronau's argument that aggregate wage rate time valuation 
understates the true value of nonworking women's time and Willis’s pro­
posal that wage rates overvalue a worker's time. This result is based 
upon the negative coefficient for in LFPD and the positive sign in 
the hours worked equation. These signs differ significantly from the 
traditional wage rate time valuation results in the preceding chapter.
The time value estimates in Tables-4.3 and 4.4 suggest that women with 
the highest time value are the homemakers. This conclusion is just the 
reverse of the wage rate model. A general time valuation procedure says 
that women work, not because the opportunity cost of wages foregone is
greater than the imputed value to home production, but because the value
37
of their marginal productivity is less at home than in the labor force.
Although the issue appears at first glance to be semantical in 
origin, correct value of derives its value from the ability to pro­
perly allocate the labor force participants between market producers. 
Whereas the wage rate time valuation procedure implies that the more
37
T h i s  a s s u m e s  t i m e  i s  m e a s u r e d  b y  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e i r  m a r g i n a l  
p r o d u c t  w i t h  a l l  o f  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  c o m p e t i t i v e  c o n d i t i o n s  i m p l i e d .
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productive worker enters the labor force and the less productive woman
remains at home, the general time valuation procedure states that the
more productive woman in the home should remain in the home. Clearly,
both valuation procedures lead to opposite policies designed to encour-
38
age the optimal level of output from women in the economy.
Perhaps the fallacy of the wage rate procedure can be illus­
trated by comparing the apparent contradiction between the two time 
value measures in the labor force discriminant equation and the hours 
worked equation. Consistent with wage rate time valuation theory, hours 
worked responds positively to changes in (0.098 for white women and 
0.059 for black women) although white women have a higher elasticity of 
hours worked with respect to time value— 2.073 to 1.415. Conformity of 
the measure with traditional specifications suggests that the two 
approaches are approximately equal_in explaining choice of hours worked 
among women in the labor force. The negative time value response in 
both discriminant equations suggests that the real failure of traditional
wage rate time valuation is its inability to accurately measure the time
39value of nonworking women.
OQ
Greater marginal home productivity can stem from the nature 
of the production process for which some women may be uniquely suited, 
or because imperfections in the labor market, such as female labor dis­
crimination, arbitrarily reduce market productivity below home produc­
tivity.
39The unresolved issue at this time concerns the formation of 
the reservation wage and its exact relationship with wage rates. Willis 
and Becker would presumably argue that reservation wages are linearly 
related to wage rates. As such, autonomous shifts in wage rates pro­
duces an equivalent shift in the reservation wage. Countering the lin­
earity approach, Gronau would probably cite the increase in marginal 
productivity associated with specialization in the home as cause for a 
nonlinear, if any, relationship between wage rates and reservation wages.
Ill
Of special interest is the maximum likelihood measurement of 
Vj.'s impact upon labor force activity within the nonlinear framework.
The negative, significant parameter estimates, -0.0104 and -0.0157, of 
in the black-white samples respectfully indicates the labor discrimi­
nant equations dominance under a nonlinear equation specification. In 
addition to the sign, a second change between the two estimation proce^ 
dures involves the smaller differential between the respective coeffi­
cients, and a smaller size of the actual parameter estimate. Converting 
the nonlinear estimates into elasticities produces respective black- 
white values of -0.10 and -0.28; or while the total response rate of 
secondary laborers is inelastic, the response rate to hours worked dep­
rived above is elastic.
Regardless of the differences in estimation procedures, both 
approaches support the argument for an alternative time valuation
Since the time theory literature is devoid of any attempts to 
directly tackle this problem, wage rates impact upon reservation wages 
is empirically determined using a linear and nonlinear specification. 
Specifically, the estimated equations with attitudinal variables
described previously included are:
RW (linear) = 0.876 + 0.614*ATH - 0.113‘ATW + 0.44'WR 
(0.214) (0.332) (0.076) (0.35)
r 2 = 0.413, SE = 0.50, N = 295 (4.2)
RW (nonlinear) = 0.086 + 0.734'ATH - 0.331'ATW + 0.37'WR 
(0.054) (0.413) (0.157) (0.27)
r 2 = 0.48, SE = 0.08, N = 295 (4.2a)
In both equations attitude toward housework and attitude toward work are 
more important determinants of reservation wages than wage rates. More 
importantly, the decrease in utility associated with working (-0.331) 
offsets part of the pecuniary gains accruing to the worker (0.37). Thus, 
the net effect of working upon the reservation wage is almost zero, or
0.37 - 0.331 = 0.039 = 0.0.
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measure and this paper's assertion that a general time value variable 
can be constructed.
2. Black-White and Individual Equation Differences
Notable differences among the racial labor force response pat­
terns to preschool children can be observed in the positive labor force 
reaction from black females, while the corresponding white female leaves 
the labor force. A similar finding by Gregory explains the difference 
as the result of "the apparently greater ability of nonwhite mothers to 
remain in the labor force despite the presence of preschool children in 
the home and the entry of teenage family members into the labor force to 
. . . support the larger family size." This result provides microeconomic 
support for Gregory's and Hill-Stafford's belief that the "most important 
marginal time cost of black children is the loss of leisure, and not 
hours worked as in the case of white women." However, this finding to­
gether with the observed decline in black hours worked as the number of 
preschool children increases suggests that the leisure loss declines at 
a diminishing rate. The opposite response to preschool children by white 
women shifts the potential leisure loss from child acquisition by reduc­
ing the time spent at work. The differential responses observed here 
confirms Gronau's hypothesis that the significant cost of children is 
the loss of leisure for black women and the reduction in hours worked 
for white women.
The reaction among white laborers to increased direct work costs 
is a reduction in both labor force participation and hours worked. The 
response to indirect costs— the time cost of commuting— supports the
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findings of Gronau, Gregory, and Hill-Stafford that white women preserve 
leisure time by reducing labor force activity and black women reduce 
hours worked when possible (-0.00232 in LFPD in Table 4.4), but typi­
cally substitute leisure for hours worked (0.0569 in HW in Table 4.4). 
Combining the labor participation and hours worked reaction to the in­
direct costs and preschool cost demonstrates the differential response 
pattern by ethnic groups.
The remaining variables conform to the expected signs and magni­
tudes, although significance tests upon education for white women and 
attitude toward work in the black equations prove disappointing. While 
the lack of statistical significance for education cannot be explained, 
the attitude toward work for black women is apparently another manifes­
tation of the black woman's willingness to substitute leisure for work. 
Unlike the marriage equations in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, attitudinal vari­
ables do not appear to significantly alter the black woman's labor force 
pattern relative to the time cost of transportation and child time require­
ments. However, for white women, attitudinal considerations lend cre­
dence to a sociological interpretation of labor force determination.
The significance of net assets in the labor determination equa­
tions provides preliminary support for the Barzel-McDonald hypothesis 
that total family income disguises the relative importance of human and 
non-human income upon labor activity. Barzel-McDonald believe that net 
assets' importance exceeds that of human wealth in determining labor 
force activity. Comparison of the respective coefficient magnitudes 
for husbands indicates the importance of net assets, but still places
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primary emphasis upon human capital wealth. A further demonstration of 
human wealth’s greater role can be illustrated by observing that the 
white woman’s hours worked elasticity for net assets of 0.05% compares 
to the equivalent measure for husband’s human wealth of -0.395%, and 
the opposite finding, 0.113 to -0.134, for black women. So, although 
the coefficients fail to support the arguments for equal importance 
between human and nonhuman wealth, the black elasticity measures provide 
enough evidence of nonhuman wealth’s importance to prevent complete re­
jection of the Barzel-McDonald proposition.
B e s i d e s  t h e  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t i m e  v a l u e  b e t w e e n  e q u a t i o n s  d i s c u s s e d  
e a r l i e r ,  a n o t h e r  n o t a b l e  d e v i a t i o n  b e t w e e n  e q u a t i o n s  a n d  r a c e s  r e f l e c t s  
t h e  w o m a n ’ s  l a b o r  f o r c e  r e s p o n s e  t o  h e r  s p o u s e ’ s  a t t i t u d e s .  T h e  m a le  
a t t i t u d i n a l  v a r i a b l e  i s  i m p o r t a n t  i n  tw o  r e s p e c t s :  f i r s t ,  a s  a  m e a s u r e
o f  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  s p o u s e  a t t i t u d e s  a f f e c t  w o r k  d e c i s i o n s ,  a n d  
s e c o n d l y ,  a s  a n  e m p i r i c a l  t e s t  o f  t h e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  a r g u m e n t  i n  C h a p t e r  
I I  t h a t  a s s u m p t i o n s  o f  in d e p e n d e n c e  b e t w e e n  i n d i v i d u a l  f a m i l y  m e m b e r s ’ 
u t i l i t y  l e v e l s  v i o l a t e s  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  w h a t  a  f a m i l y  i s — t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  
o f  i n d i v i d u a l  p r e f e r e n c e s .  G i v e n  t h e  n e g a t i v e ,  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o e f f i c i e n t  
i n  t h e  w h i t e  HW e q u a t i o n  a n d  p o s i t i v e ,  s l i g h t l y  l e s s  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o e f f i ­
c i e n t  i n  t h e  b l a c k  HW e q u a t i o n ,  a  u t i l i t y  in d e p e n d e n c e  a s s u m p t i o n  i n  
h o u s e h o l d  m a x i m i z a t i o n  i s  n o t  o n l y  u n w a r r a n t e d ,  b u t  c o m p l e t e l y  e r r o n e o u s .
W i l l i s ,  B e c k e r ,  a n d  o t h e r s  d e f e n d  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a s s u m p t i o n  
b y  a p p e a l i n g  t o  t h e  l o g i c  t h a t ,  " . . .  t h e  f a m i l y  w i l l  t e n d  t o  r e s p o n d  
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  t o  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o r  s h a p e  o f  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  
i t  f a c e s . "  N o t e  t h a t  t h i s  q u o t a t i o n  b e a r s  a  r e m a r k a b l e  r e s e m b l a n c e  t o  
D u e s e n b e r r y ’ s  c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e  q u a l i t y - q u a n t i t y  d i s c u s s i o n  t h a t  t h e  
a b o v e  a u t h o r s  h e l d  i n  a b e y a n c e ;  f o r  i f  a l l  f a m i l y  m e m b e rs  m e r e l y  r e a c t  
t o  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  im p o s e d  u p o n  t h e  f a m i l y ,  i t  i s  l o g i c a l l y  i n c o n s i s t e n t
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Only by allowing respective family member's utility levels to interact 
can the decision-making process within the family be accurately described.
A less debated point is the observation that husbands' attitudes 
apparently do not affect the decision to work, but do alter time spent 
working. For example, these results indicate that white women apparently 
reduce their labor force activity if their spouse wants them to. Black 
women appear to work in spite of their husband's desires. Although a 
definitive explanation of the difference is unavailable, a tentative 
sociological justification for the difference emphasizes the greater 
cohesiveness among white couples that manifests itself in greater re­
sponsiveness to spouse preferences. Unfortunately, the absence of 
attitudinal variables in a range of studies makes this interpretation 
tentative.
3. Tobit and TLP Compared
The general conclusions derived from the comparison between the 
two methodologies in marriage also hold here: linearization of the non­
linear decision-making process yields more detailed information about 
the relative impact of the variables, Tobit was more time consuming, 
and Tobit had a lower mean ex post forecasting error. One principal
distinction between the marriage and labor force results was the absence 
of expected values outside the 0-1 bounds in the LFPD equation. This
to argue further that some family members can disregard these constraints 
in order to alter the quality component of children, especially when the 
children have some influence in the quality decision-making process. 
Clearly, to use Griliches' term, the "new household demand" school has 
to abandon either their independence justification or quality-quantity 
difference to be logically consistent.
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emphasizes the "maybe" warning in econometric literature against the 
TLP procedure. If TLP forecasts could circumvent this failing as con­
sistently as it did here, the primary objection to its use would be 
minimized.
C. Fertility Equations
Because fertility studies which restrict their samples to fami­
lies with children (equation (3.2)) disguise the effect of childless 
couples upon family size determination, the following equations directly 
consider the relative impacts of the determining variables upon the 
initial decision to have children and the subsequent family size selec­
tion. Though the results reported below indicate continued variations 
in black=white response patterns, superiority of the Tobit procedure, 
and the general time value's flexibility over the wage rate measure, 
each is discussed in the same order as the labor force results.
1. Value of Time
For comparison with the wage rate time valuation procedure esti­
mated in equation (3.11), wage time valuation indicates a reduction in 
white family size by -0.0018 units and the corresponding black child 
time cost is -0.0002. Because equation (3.11) does not include child­
less couples, direct comparisons of and WR are restricted to the FS 
results in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. In general, the time measure exceeds 
the wage rate measure by a factor of two in the black sample and over 
one and a half in the white sample. This gap supports Gronau's belief 
that a wage rate proxy understates the true cost of children by
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undervaluing non-working women's time value. Once the undervaluation 
for non-working women and overvaluation of working women is corrected 
for in V^, time price in child cost function becomes the primary economic 
determinant of family size. Further, computation of the respective elas­
ticities at their means produces a relatively inelastic response to the 
white-black wage rate measure of 0.43 and 0.62, respectively. Similar 
calculations based upon yield elasticities of 0.89 and 0.93 respec­
tively. That is, the wage rate time valuation procedure not only under­
estimates the magnitude of time price upon family size, but seriously 
underestimates family size responsiveness to the price of time. These 
results confirm the importance of economic time valuation in family size 
determination even when the noneconomic attitudinal variables are in­
cluded.
Comparison of time value's.coefficient in the child discriminant 
function with the family size equation shows that time price has its 
major impact upon the discriminant function for children. The two coef­
ficients taken together, -0.0074 and -0.0030, support Gregory's early 
position that the marginal time price of additional children is negative 
and decreases with additional children. So, not only is the marginal 
time price the proper determinant of family size, but is shown here to 
decrease as children are added to the family.
While white women respond negatively to time prices in family 
size selection in both equations, time price does not significantly 
affect the black woman's decision to bear and raise children. Apparently 
black women do not monetarize their time value into the child decision-
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making process. To the extent that this explanation is valid, it par­
tially explains the larger families found among blacks. Ignoring time 
price prevents the black culture from forming a number of childless 
families. Reduction in black fertility could be accomplished through 
encouraging childless black couples as well as reducing the larger 
family sizes. Policies designed to affect the discriminant and family
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size decisions jointly will be more effective in controlling fertility.
2. Black-White and Equation Differences
Surprisingly, one major difference between the racial groups 
involves the black's negative and white's positive reaction to the only 
direct child cost variable— ECC. The surprise stems from fertility 
theories description of white families as being more aware and thus more 
responsive to child costs, and this awareness of child costs explains 
much of the differential family sizes among the races. If these rela­
tionships survive further empirical testing, direct child costs appar­
ently plays a greater role in the black family size selection than in a 
corresponding white family.
^^To illustrate this point, suppose a sample of 10 white 
families and 10 black families produced the following distribution.
Sample
Number of Children
White
Black
2 2 2 2 2 
1 1 1 3  2
For black women the mean number of children is 25/10=2.5 while white 
women possess only 2.0 children. Policies designed to reduce fertility 
among blacks should emphasize the need to increase the number of black 
women in the 0 and 1 classes, not just the.women bearing 4 or more chil­
dren.
119
One logical explanation for larger black families can also be 
found in the larger positive, significant coefficients for the child 
attitude variable among black women. Besides providing additional sup­
port for the value of attitudinal variables in economic research, this 
finding adds some empirical support to the sociologists' contention that 
black family sizes are "primarily" determined by a "greater love for 
children." In both the black child discriminant and family size equa­
tions, the attitude toward children variable dominates all other coeffi­
cients describing a family's consumption of children. The coefficient 
value of 1.023 in the family size equation indicates an exact correspond­
ence between a change in attitudes and the addition of a child to the 
family. Likewise, the 0.095 ATC coefficient in the discriminant equation 
exceeds the other parameter estimates in magnitude, and further supports 
the high preference for children among the black population. Perhaps the 
real significance of the attitudinal variable is as a personal preference 
explanation for black family sizes. As such, economic policies designed 
to reduce minority family sizes to a secondary status will be limited.
Observance of the negative attitude toward children in the white 
family size equation along with the expected positive sign in the child 
discriminant functions raises doubts about the precise relationship 
between attitudes and children in family size determination. One possi­
ble interpretation explains the difference by appealing to the logic of 
the child quality-quantity issue raised by Becker and others. The posi­
tive ATC coefficient in the CD equation along with the negative effect 
in the FS equation illustrates a white child demand that declines as
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family size selection continues. Apparently white mothers enjoy a posi­
tive preference for children which diminishes with the addition of 
children to the family. That is, the added child's marginal contribu­
tion to total child quality is perceived to be negative for white women. 
Therefore, maximization of child services can only be obtained through 
production of a smaller number of children.
Both the black and white discussions of ATC belie entirely eco­
nomic explanations of fertility behavior by emphasizing the noneconomic 
utility generating nature of children. Given the importance of these 
preferences in family size formation, policies for birth control policies 
based completely upon economic tenets will have a low success rate as 
long as they exclude the mother's attitude toward children. In the case 
of black mothers, changes in contraceptive knowledge and techniques, 
income maintenance, and medical programs merely provide the vehicle for 
realizing total child services. The key element is still the willingness 
to use them. Further, this explanation illustrates one reason for the 
failure of extensive fertility programs in less developed countries to 
alter family child production behavior. This failure will continue so 
long as parents envision quantity as the most important determinant of 
child services.
Inclusion of the mother's attitude toward children reduces the 
importance assigned to education. Education in traditional models pur­
portedly measures the "desire for and ability to plan and carry out child 
production desires." With desires accounted for with ATC, education re­
duces to a measure of capability for implementing the desired child
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production level. As such the coefficients, -0.109 and -0.1367, for 
white and black women respectively enhances Gregory's empirical demon­
stration that one source of the greater black fertility differential 
stems from "the inability to equate actual and desired family size"—  
even when the "net effect of education's total impact on both preferences 
and fertility control" is reduced to the gross effect of fertility con­
trol by holding preferences constant.
In general the remaining results conform to the findings in 
equation (3.11), except to note that converting the respective black- 
white family size responses of -0.0043 and -0.00289 of net assets into 
corresponding elasticity form produces the values -5.99% and -4.79%, 
and supports a Barzel-McDonald asset theory that family size responds 
relatively more to assets than to human capital income. The importance 
of maintaining a separate net asset variable relates to its potential 
for meshing different policies. Since the primary determinant of the 
white net asset position is home ownership, policies designed to increase 
home ownership, especially among blacks, engender corresponding benefits 
in the reduction of family size.
While the general findings reported here downplay economic the­
ories importance in explaining fertility behavior, they also buttress 
three conventional economic fertility determinants— education, time 
value, and net assets— as being important factors in the mother's deci­
sion to bear and rear children.
3. Tobit and TLP Compared
Unlike the findings in the marriage and labor force equations.
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the Tobit forecasts in the fertility equation were unequivocally supe­
rior to the twin linear probability predictions for both samples. The 
respective white-black mean square errors, 1.61 and 1.47, are signifi­
cantly less than the corresponding error components for TLP, 5.41 and 
2.40. Further, TLP failed to keep the predicted endogenous values with­
in the predefined bounds 17 and 9 times in the white-black samples re­
spectively. This failure to constrain the predicted values within the 
model's bounds simultaneously lends credence to the warnings in the 
econometric literature against TLP, and explains the poor forecasting 
performance of the linearization procedure. Rouch calculations of the 
17 and 9 incorrect forecasts reduces the magnitude of the MSE to almost 
the quivalent values for the Tobit results when the incorrect expected 
values are restricted to either the upper or lower bound.
With respect to coefficient differences between the two estima­
tion procedures, the results conform in sign and magnitude in general, 
and therefore not pursued here. The most notable deviations from the 
TLP results are the positive insignificant education coefficient and 
the negative child care cost coefficient (as it should be) in the white 
sample. Contrary to the previous equations in which the Tobit para­
meters appeared to represent the weighted interaction of the two TLP 
parameters, the education and child cost parameters deviate signifi­
cantly from the TLP coefficients as the result of sign reversals and 
lower significance levels. The educational variable change conflicts 
with accepted theory, while movement in child costs corresponds to the 
theory set forth in the fertility determination theoretical literature.
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T h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a n  e s t a b l i s h e d  b o d y  o f  e m p i r i c a l  r e s e a r c h  m a k e s  a l l  c o n ­
c l u s i o n s  t e n t a t i v e ,  e x c e p t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  s u p e r i o r  m e t h o d o l o g y  i n h e r e n t  
w i t h i n  T o b i t  a n a l y s i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i t s  c o e f f i c i e n t s  w i l l  b e  c l o s e r  t o  
t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  p a r a m e t e r .
A s  b e f o r e  T L P  r e q u i r e d  l e s s  c o m p u t a t i o n a l  t i m e  t o  p e r f o r m  t h e  
r e q u i r e d  a l g o r i t h m s ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  m a i n t a i n s  a n  a d v a n t a g e  o v e r  t h e  m o r e  
e x p e n s i v e  T o b i t  p r o c e d u r e  f o r  u s e r s  w i t h  l i m i t e d  c o m p u t e r  t i m e .  H o w e v e r ,  
t h e  v a r i a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  s t a t i s t i c a l  f o r e c a s t s  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n  o b t a i n e d  . 
f r o m  t h e  p a r a m e t e r  e s t i m a t e s  i n  e a c h  m e t h o d o lo g y  s u g g e s t s  a n  o p t i m a l  r e ­
s e a r c h  s c h e m a  w h ic h  u t i l i z e s  b o t h  m e t h o d o l o g i e s  c o n c u r r e n t l y .  H o p e f u l l y ,  
u s i n g  b o t h  t e c h n i q u e s  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  w i l l  p r o v i d e  t h e  a d d e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  
f r o m  T L P  a n d  e x t r a  s t a t i s t i c a l  f o r e c a s t i n g  e f f i c i e n c y  d e r i v e d  f r o m  T o b i t  
a n a l y s i s ,
I V . S u m m a ry
T h e  c h a n g e s  m a d e  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  h a v e  p r o d u c e d  s e v e r a l  m a j o r  
p o i n t s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  t i m e  v a l u a t i o n  m e th o d  c o n s i s t e n t l y  o u t p e r ­
f o r m s  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  w a g e  r a t e  t i m e  v a l u e  m e a s u r e  i n  b o t h  t h e  b l a c k  a n d  
w h i t e  s a m p l e s .  T h a t  i s ,  t h e  w a g e  r a t e  a p p r o x i m a t i o n  t o  t i m e  v a l u e  u n d e r ­
e s t i m a t e s  t h e  t i m e  v a l u e  f o r  n o n w o r k i n g  w om en  a n d  o v e r e s t i m a t e s  t i m e  
v a l u e  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  w o r k i n g  w o m e n  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  s e r i o u s  d o u b t s  a r e  
r a i s e d  a b o u t  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  u s e  o f  w a g e  r a t e s  a s  a n  a p p r o x i m a t i o n  f o r  t i m e  
v a l u e .  I t  m u s t  b e  f u r t h e r  n o t e d  t h a t  t h i s  f i n d i n g  d o e s  n o t  d i m i n i s h  t h e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  l i t e r a t u r e — s p e c i f i c a l l y  B e c k e r 's  s e m i n a l  v a l u e  o f  t i m e  a r t i ­
c l e  b e c a u s e  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  l i t e r a t u r e  e x p l i c i t l y  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  w e a k n e s s e s  
i n  w a g e  r a t e  t i m e  v a l u a t i o n .
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S e c o n d ,  d e f i n i t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  T o b i t  a n d  T L P  f a i l e d  t o  
m a t e r i a l i z e .  G i v e n  a n  i n e f f e c t i v e  c o m p u t e r  b u d g e t  c o n s t r a i n t ,  t h e  t o t a l  
r e s u l t s  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  a l l  e q u a t i o n s  s u g g e s t s  a d o p t i o n  o f  b o t h  p r o c e d u r e s  
i n  o r d e r  t o  r e a l i z e  t h e  a d d e d  s t a t i s t i c a l  f o r e c a s t i n g  a d v a n t a g e s  i n h e r e n t  
i n  T o b i t  a n a l y s i s  a n d  t h e  e x t r a  i n f o r m a t i o n  g e n e r a t i n g  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  T L P  
r e g a r d i n g  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  e l e m e n t s  i n  t h e  n o n l i n e a r  h o u s e h o l d  d e c i s i o n ­
m a k in g  p r o c e s s .  A d o p t i o n  o f  b o t h  m e t h o d o l o g i e s  a l l o w s  t h e  r e s e a r c h e r  
t o  t e s t  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  e a c h  a p p r o a c h  f a i l s  t o ,  o r ,  f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r ,  
s u c c e e d s  i n  a d d i n g  t o  o u r  s t o r e  o f  k n o w le d g e  a b o u t  h o u s e h o l d  d e m a n d .
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  s a m p le  s e p a r a t i o n  i n t o  b l a c k - w h i t e  c o m p o n e n ts  i s  
n o t  c o n s i d e r e d  n o v e l  i n  t h a t  G r e g o r y  h a s  a l r e a d y  i l l u s t r a t e d  t h e  b e n e ­
f i t s  a c c r u i n g  f r o m  s u c h  a  s p l i t .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  i n t e r c e p t  a n a l y s i s  o f  
c o v a r i a n c e  p r o c e d u r e s  f a i l s  t o  i d e n t i f y  f u n d a m e n t a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  
t h e  r a c i a l  g r o u p s  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .  T h e  m a j o r  f i n d i n g  s u p ­
p o r t s  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  r a c i a l  f a m i l y  s i z e  r e s p o n s e s  t o  q u a l i t y  a n d  
q u a n t i t y  f a c t o r s .  I n  s p e c i f i c ,  b l a c k  f a m i l i e s  a p p e a r  t o  m a x i m iz e  t o t a l  
c h i l d  s e r v i c e s  b y  a c q u i r i n g  a  l a r g e r  t o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  c h i l d r e n — e a c h  w i t h '  
a  r e l a t i v e l y  l o w e r  q u a l i t y  r a t e ,  w h i l e  w h i t e  f a m i l i e s  m a x i m iz e  t h e i r  
y i e l d  f r o m  c h i l d  s e r v i c e s  b y  s u b s t i t u t i n g  c h i l d  q u a l i t y  f o r  c h i l d  q u a n ­
t i t y .
C H A P TE R  V  
R E V IE W  O F F IN D IN G S
I .  I n t r o d u c t i o n
D e t e r m i n i n g  a  r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t ' s  s u c c e s s  o r  f a i l u r e  d e p e n d s  u p o n  
t h e  e x i s t i n g  s t a t e  o f  t h e  a r t s  a n d  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  o p p o s i n g  v i e w s  
p r e v e n t  a n y  d o c t r i n e  f r o m  b e c o m in g  e s t a b l i s h e d .  B a s e d  u p o n  t h i s  c r i ­
t e r i o n  a n d  b e c a u s e  h o u s e h o l d  d e m a n d  s t u d i e s  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  n e w  t o  t h e  
e c o n o m ic s  d i s c i p l i n e — w i t h  a l l  o f  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  t h e  
r e s e a r c h  r e p o r t e d  h e r e  p r o v i d e s  e m p i r i c a l  v e r i f i c a t i o n  f o r  m a n y  o f  t h e  
c u r r e n t l y  d i s p u t e d  t h e o r i e s  e m i n a t i n g  f r o m  t h e  " n e w  h o u s e h o l d  d e m a n d "  
s c h o o l  o f  t h o u g h t ,  s u c h  a s  B e c k e r ,  W i l l i s ,  D e  T r a y  a n d  o t h e r s ,  w h i l e  
c o n c u r r e n t l y  s u p p o r t i n g  t h e  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  f l o w i n g  f r o m  
e c o n o m i s t s — L e i b e n s t e i n ,  G r i l i c h e s ,  G r e g o r y ,  a n d  o t h e r s  a n d  t h e  
s o c i o l o g i s t s - d e m o g r a p h e r s — R y d e r  a n d  o t h e r s .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  c r i t i c i s m s  
f r o m  t h e  s o c i o l o g i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  e m p h a s iz e  t h e  " s t u d y  o f  t h e  f a m i l y  b y  
d e s t r o y i n g  t h e  f a m i l y "  ( R y d e r ) ,  f a i l u r e  t o  c o n s i d e r  p a r e n t a l  p l e a s u r e s  
d e r i v e d  f r o m  c h i l d r e n  i n  a n y  c o n t e x t  o t h e r  t h a n  e c o n o m ic  ( G r i l i c h e s ) , 
a n d  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  s o c i o l o g i c a l  d e t e r m i n a n t s  u p o n  h o u s e h o l d  d e m a n d —  
e s p e c i a l l y  w i t h  t h e i r  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  p r i c e  a n d  in c o m e  e f f e c t s  
( L e i b e n s t e i n ) .  S i m i l a r l y ,  e c o n o m ic  c r i t i c i s m s  f o c u s  u p o n  t h e  i m p r o p e r  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  t i m e  p r i c e  f o r  l a b o r  f o r c e  a n d  n o n l a b o r  f o r c e  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  a s  w a g e s  e a r n e d  ( G r o n a u ,  W i l l i s ,  D e  S e r p a ,  a n d  J o h n s o n ) ,
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p l u s  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  l o s s  a r i s i n g  f r o m  t h e  a g g r e g a t i o n  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
r a c i a l  g r o u p s  i n t o  o n e  s a m p le  ( G r e g o r y )  a r e  a l l  f o u n d  t o  b e  i m p o r t a n t  
d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  m a r r y ,  l a b o r  f o r c e  s t a t u s ,  a n d  t h e  
o p t i m a l  n u m b e r  o f  c h i l d r e n .  H o w e v e r ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e s e  c r i t i c i s m s  i n t o  
t h e  b a s i c  n e w  h o u s e h o ld  d e m a n d  s c h o o l s  t h e o r e t i c a l  m o d e l  s u p p o r t s  m o s t  
o f  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  d e r i v e d  f r o m  p u r e l y  e c o n o m ic  a n a l y s i s — t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  
o f  s e p a r a t i n g  q u a l i t y - q u a n t i t y  f a c t o r s ,  lo w  in c o m e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  d e m a n d  
f o r  c h i l d r e n ,  a n d  t i m e  p r i c e ’ s  i m p o r t a n c e  a s  a  f a c t o r  o f  p r o d u c t i o n .
T h e  m a j o r  u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d  " n e w  h o u s e h o l d  d e m a n d "  t h e o r y  w a s  t h e  i n d e ­
p e n d e n c e  a s s u m p t i o n  b e t w e e n  i n d i v i d u a l  f a m i l y  m e m b e r ’ s  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s .  
E a c h  m a j o r  f i n d i n g  i s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  b e l o w .
I I .  M a j o r  F i n d i n g s  
T o  i n s t i t u t e  som e c l a r i t y  i n t o  t h e  c o m p l i c a t e d  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  
h o u s e h o ld  d e m a n d  l i t e r a t u r e ,  t h e  c r i t i c a l  c o n c l u s i o n s  o f  t h i s  s t u d y  
a r e  s e p a r a t e d  i n t o  t h o s e  a r i s i n g  f r o m  m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  a n d  
e q u a t i o n  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s ,  r e s p e c t f u l l y .
A .  M e t h o d o l o g i c a l  F i n d i n g s
1 .  E s t i m a t i o n  P r o c e d u r e s
A l t h o u g h  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  o t h e r  s t u d i e s  c o m p a r in g  T o b i t  a n d  T L P  
m a k e s  t h e  f i n d i n g s  r e p o r t e d  h e r e  t e n t a t i v e ,  b o t h  t e c h n i q u e s  a p p e a r  t o  
p r o v i d e  a  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  n o n l i n e a r i t i e s  e m b o d ie d  i n  t h e  
h o u s e h o l d  d e m a n d  p r o c e s s  t h a n  OLS e s t i m a t i o n s .  C o m p a r is o n s  i n  a l l  t h r e e  
e q u a t i o n s  a r e  f o u n d  t o  f a v o r  T o b i t  a n a l y s i s  f r o m  a  p u r e l y  s t a t i s t i c a l  
p e r s p e c t i v e  f o r  f o r e c a s t i n g  p u r p o s e s  a n d  T L P  a s  a  v e h i c l e  f o r  o b t a i n i n g  
g r e a t e r  i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  d e t e r m i n a n t ’ s  i m p a c t  u p o n  t h e
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s e p a r a t e  e q u a t i o n s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e s e  e a r l y  f i n d i n g s  s u g g e s t  u s a g e  o f  
b o t h  p r o c e d u r e s  w h e n  p o s s i b l e ,  T L P  w h e n  s t r i c t l y  p o l i c y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
a r e  d e s i r e d ,  a n d  T o b i t  f o r  s t u d i e s  p r i m a r i l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  f o r e c a s t i n g  
r e s u l t s .
2 .  R a c i a l  D i f f e r e n c e s
C u r r e n t  h o u s e h o l d  s t u d i e s  a g g r e g a t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  r a c i a l  g r o u p s  
i n t o  o n e  s a m p le  h a s  b e e n  c h a l l e n g e d  b y  a  n u m b e r  o f  a u t h o r s  i n  v a r i o u s  
d i s c i p l i n e s .  B e c a u s e  t h e s e  s t u d i e s  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  d a t a ,  e m p i r i c a l ,  
a n d  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  e r r o r s  i l l u m i n a t e d  e a r l i e r ,  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  
o f  r a c i a l  f a c t o r s  i s  r e e v a l u a t e d  a g a i n .  E a r l i e r  s t u d i e s  m a i n  f i n d i n g  
t h a t  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  l o s s  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  a g g r e g a t i o n  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  
e n o u g h  t o  j u s t i f y  a  d i s a g g r e g a t e d  a p p r o a c h  w h e n e v e r  p o s s i b l e  i s  r e a f ­
f i r m e d  h e r e .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  d o m in a n c e  b y  t h e  w h i t e  s a m p le  i n  s t a t i s t i c a l  
a n a l y s i s  d i s g u i s e s  t h e  n o n w h i t e  p o p u l a t i o n s  r e a c t i o n  t o  e c o n o m ic  a n d  
n o n e c o n o m ic  s t i m u l i  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  p o l i c i e s  b a s e d  u p o n  a g g r e g a t e d  
s t u d i e s  m a y  p r o v e  t o  b e  m o r e  h a r m f u l  t h a n  u s e f u l  t o  t h e  n o n w h i t e  s e g m e n t  
o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  b l a c k  w o m e n ’ s  l a b o r  f o r c e  r e s p o n s e  t o  
a d d i t i o n a l  p r e s c h o o l  c h i l d r e n  w a s  s h o w n  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  l e n g t h  o f  t h e i r  
w o r k  d a y ,  w h i l e  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o t a l  e f f e c t  ( i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 9 ) )  a n d  
w h i t e  e f f e c t  ( i n  T a b l e  4 . 1 )  s u g g e s t s  a  d e c r e a s e  i n  l a b o r  f o r c e  a c t i v i t y .  
T h u s ,  p o l i c i e s  d e s i g n e d  t o  a l t e r  b l a c k  l a b o r  f o r c e  a c t i v i t y  t h a t  a l s o  
c h a n g e s  t h e  f a m i l i e s  c h i l d  c o m p o s i t i o n  p r o d u c e s  o p p o s i t e  r e a c t i o n s  b e ­
t w e e n  t h e  r a c i a l  g r o u p s .
T h e  s e c o n d  i s s u e  i n  b l a c k - w h i t e  r e s e a r c h  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  " b e s t "  
m e a n s  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  r a c i a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  e m p i r i c a l l y .  O n e  a p p r o a c h  com m on
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i n  t h e  e c o n o m e t r i c  l i t e r a t u r e  a p p l i e s  a n a l y s i s  o f  c o v a r i a n c e  t e c h n i q u e s  
w i t h i n  a  s i n g l e  s e t  o f  r e g r e s s i o n s .  T h e  p r i m a r y  a l t e r n a t i v e  s p l i t s  t h e  
m a in  s a m p le  i n t o  t h e  r e l e v a n t  n u m b e r  o f  r a c i a l l y  d e t e r m i n e d  s u b g r o u p s .  
A l t h o u g h  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  a n  i n t e r c e p t  a n a l y s i s  o f  c o v a r i a n c e  p r o c e d u r e ,  
t h e  r e s u l t s  r e p o r t e d  p r e v i o u s l y  p r o v i d e  e v i d e n c e  o f  a  s t a t i s t i c a l  a d v a n ­
t a g e  o v e r  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  m o d e l .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  t h e  r a c i a l l y  d e t e r m i n e d  
s l o p e  r e s p o n s e  p a t t e r n s  a r e  d i s g u i s e d .  K n o w le d g e  o f  t h e s e  p a t t e r n s  i s  
r e q u i r e d  b e f o r e  p o l i c i e s  d e s i g n e d  t o  r e a c h  a l l  g r o u p s  e q u a l l y  o r  t o  c o n ­
c e n t r a t e  u p o n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  r a c e  c a n  b e  e f f e c t i v e .
B . E q u a t i o n  D e t e r m i n a n t s
1 .  T im e  V a l u e  M e a s u r e m e n t
D i s e n c h a n t m e n t  w i t h  a c t u a l  w a g e  r a t e  t i m e  v a l u a t i o n  h a s  l e d  t o  
t h e  s u g g e s t e d  u s e  o f  t h e  w o m a n 's  r e s e r v a t i o n  w a g e  f o r  n o n l a b o r  f o r c e  
w om en  a n d  a  w e i g h t e d  w a g e  r a t e  m e a s u r e  f o r  l a b o r  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  T h e  
g e n e r a l  t i m e  v a l u e  m e a s u r e  f i n d s  t h a t  t h e  w a g e  r a t e  t i m e  v a l u a t i o n  s i m u l ­
t a n e o u s l y  u n d e r s t a t e s  t h e  h o m e m a k e r 's  c o n t r i b u t i o n  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  
h o m e p r o d u c e d  g o o d s  a n d  o v e r s t a t e s  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  l a b o r  f o r c e  p a r t i c ­
i p a n t s  v a l u e  o f  t i m e .  T h e  n e t  e f f e c t  i s  a n  e r r o n e o u s  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  t i m e  
i n  f a v o r  o f  l a b o r  f o r c e  a c t i v i t y .  T o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e s e  f i n d i n g s  a r e  
s u p p o r t e d  b y  f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h ,  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  t o  e m p i r i c a l l y  e x p l a i n  m a n y  
w o m e n 's  f o r e g o i n g  s u b s t a n t i v e  m o n e t a r y  i n c e n t i v e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  r e m a i n  i n  
t h e  h o m e  e x c e p t  f o r  v a g u e  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  a t t i t u d e s  c a n  b e  e x p l a i n e d .
I n c l u d i n g  t h e  m o d i f i e d  t i m e  v a l u e  v a r i a b l e  i n t o  t h e  f e r t i l i t y  
a n d  l a b o r  f o r c e  e q u a t i o n s  i n d i c a t e s  a n  u n d e r v a l u a t i o n  o f  t i m e  i n  t h e  
f e r t i l i t y  a n d  l a b o r  f o r c e  e q u a t i o n  b y  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  w a g e  r a t e  t i m e
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m e a s u r e .  T h e  d i r e c t  e f f e c t  o f  t i m e  v a l u e  u p o n  l a b o r  f o r c e  a c t i v i t y  
e x p e r i e n c e d  a  n e g a t i v e  s i g n  i n s t e a d  o f  t h e  n o r m a l l y  a s s u m e d  p o s i t i v e  
c o e f f i c i e n t .  A l t h o u g h  t h i s  a n o m a lo u s  r e s u l t  i s  e x p l a i n e d  i n  g r e a t e r  
d e t a i l  I n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  c h a p t e r ,  i t  c o n f i r m s  G r o n a u 's  a r g u m e n t s  t h a t  
w om en  w o r k  b e c a u s e  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e i r  n e t  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t  i n  t h e  h o m e  
i s  l e s s  t h a n  t h e i r  n e t  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e . S o ,  
w h e n  t h e  r e l a t i v e  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t s  a r e  r e v e r s e d ,  t h e s e  w o m e n  h a v e  a n  
e c o n o m ic  i n c e n t i v e  t o  r e m a i n  i n  t h e  h o m e . H o p e f u l l y ,  w i t h  G r o n a u 's  
t h e o r e t i c a l  b a s e  a n d  t h i s  e m p i r i c a l  w o r k ,  t h e  m y t h  t h a t  n o n w o r k i n g  w om en  
c o n t r i b u t e  l i t t l e  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  s o c i a l  p r o d u c t  w i l l  b e  d i s c a r d e d  i n  
f a v o r  o f  a  m o r e  e n l i g h t e n e d  v i e w .
2 .  V a l u e  o f  A t t i t u d i n a l  V a r i a b l e s
I n c o r p o r a t i n g  i n d i v i d u a l  f a m i l y  m e m b e r 's  a t t i t u d e s  i n t o  t h e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  e c o n o m ic  m o d e l  b o t h  s u p p o r t e d  a n d  a r g u e d  a g a i n s t  a l l  s c h o o l s  
o f  t h o u g h t  i n  h o u s e h o l d  d e m a n d  t h e o r y .  P a r t i c u l a r l y  i m p o r t a n t  t o  R y d e r ' s  
c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e  u t i l i t y  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a s s u m p t i o n  i s  t h e  f e m a l e ' s  s i g n i f i ­
c a n t  r e s p o n s e  t o  h e r  s p o u s e 's  a t t i t u d e s  i n  t h e  l a b o r  e q u a t i o n s  a n d  h e r  
c h o i c e  o f  s p o u s e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h o s e  a t t i t u d e s  i n  t h e  s p o u s e  s e l e c t i o n  
e q u a t i o n .  T h u s ,  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  r a i s e  s e r i o u s  d o u b t s  a b o u t  t h e  m a in  a s s u m p ­
t i o n s  u n d e r l y i n g  t h e  c u r r e n t  t h e o r e t i c a l  b a s e  o f  t h e  n e w  h o u s e h o l d  d e m a n d  
s c h o o l  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  a n d  W i l l i s ' s  m o d e l  i n  s p e c i f i c .  H o w e v e r ,  e x t e n s i o n  
o f  t h e  m o d e l  d e v e l o p e d  i n  C h a p t e r  I I  t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  m a l e ' s  r e s p o n s e  t o  
h i s  w i f e ' s  a t t i t u d e s  s o l v e s  t h i s  m a j o r  c r i t i c i s m ,  a n d  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  c u r ­
r e n t  c o n c l u s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  h o m e  d e m a n d s  a r e  n o t  w r o n g  a b s o l u t e l y — j u s t  
b a s e d  u p o n  a  t e n u o u s  a s s u m p t i o n .
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T h e  s t r o n g  e m p i r i c a l  f i n d i n g s  f o r  t h e  a t t i t u d i n a l  v a r i a b l e s  
c o n f i r m s  t h e  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  G r i l i c h e s  a n d  L e i b e n s t e i n  a g a i n s t  c u r r e n t  
r e s e a r c h e s  f a i l u r e  t o  p e r m i t  a t t i t u d e s  t o  e n t e r  t h e  h o u s e h o l d  d e c i s i o n ­
m a k in g  p r o c e s s .  B u t  i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  s t r o n g  s h o w in g  o f  t h e  a t t i t u d i n a l  
v a r i a b l e s ,  o n l y  t h e  m a g n i t u d e s  o f  t h e  p r i c e  a n d  in c o m e  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  
d i m i n i s h e d ,  a n d  n o t  t h e i r  v a l u e  f o r  e x p l a i n i n g  h o u s e h o l d  d e m a n d .  A l ­
t h o u g h  t h e s e  f i n d i n g s  s u p p o r t  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  u s e  o f  a t t i t u d i n a l  v a r i a b l e s ,  
t h e y  a l s o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  c a s e  f o r  t h e  o n g o in g  u s e  o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  e c o ­
n o m ic  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  h o u s e h o l d  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  d e v e l o p e d  b y  t h e  n e w  
h o u s e h o l d  d e m a n d  s c h o o l  o f  t h o u g h t .
3 .  I n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  I n d i v i d u a l  U t i l i t y  F u n c t i o n s
O f  a l l  t h e  p o i n t s  o f  v i e w  c u r r e n t l y  i n  v o g u e ,  o n l y  t h e  c o n s t r u c ­
t i o n  o f  a  f a m i l y  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  f a i l e d  t o  r e c e i v e  a n y  e m p i r i c a l  s u p ­
p o r t .  M o r e  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  e v i d e n c e  i n d i c a t e s  s u c h  a  h i g h  
d e g r e e  o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  t h a t  m a t h e m a t i c a l  f o r m a t i o n s  b a s e d  u p o n  f a m i l y  
u t i l i t y  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  q u e s t i o n a b l e  a t  b e s t ,  a n d  v e r y  l i k e l y  
e r r o n e o u s .  T h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  s t e p  t o w a r d  d e v e l o p i n g  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r m u ­
l a t i o n  f o r  h o u s e h o l d  u t i l i t y  m a x i m i z a t i o n  o r i g i n a t e d  i n  C h a p t e r  I I  s u g ­
g e s t s  o n e  a v e n u e  f o r  f u r t h e r  m a t h e m a t i c a l  r e s e a r c h .
I I I .  S u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  F u r t h e r  R e s e a r c h  
L i k e  m o s t  e m p i r i c a l  r e s e a r c h ,  m o r e  q u e s t i o n s  a r e  r a i s e d  t h a n  
a n s w e r e d .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  c o n s i s t e n t l y  g o o d  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e s  w e r e  
e d u c a t i o n  a n d  w a g e  r a t e s  ( o r  V ^ )  i n  a l l  e q u a t i o n s  a n d  a g e  o f  m a r r i a g e  
i n  t h e  f e r t i l i t y  e q u a t i o n .  F o r  a l l  t h r e e  v a r i a b l e s ,  a  g o o d  r a t i o n a l e
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c a n  b e  m a d e  f o r  m a k in g  t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s  e n d o g e n o u s .  A g e  a t  m a r r i a g e  
h a s  p r e v i o u s l y  b e e n  m a d e  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  w a g e  r a t e s  b y  
K e e l y ,  w h i l e  a  n u m b e r  o f  l a b o r  r e s e a r c h e r s  h a v e  m a d e  e d u c a t i o n  a  p r o m i ­
n e n t  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  w a g e  r a t e s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  E c k a u s ,  C a m p b e l l - C u r t i s ,  
a n d  o t h e r  h u m a n  c a p i t a l  r e s e a r c h e r s  m a k e  e d u c a t i o n  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  e x ­
p e c t e d  w a g e  r a t e s .  O b v i o u s l y ,  so m e  o f  t h e  d e t e r m i n i n g  v a r i a b l e s  i n  
t h e  e q u a t i o n s  d e v e l o p e d  e a r l i e r  a r e  a c t u a l l y  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  e a c h  o t h e r .  
A l t h o u g h  K e e l e y  h a s  d o n e  p r e l i m i n a r y  w o r k "  u p o n  t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  t h e  
a g e  a t  m a r r i a g e  a n d  a n  i n i t i a l  s t u d y  i s  u n d e r w a y  a t  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
H o u s t o n  t o  d e v e l o p  a  m o d e l  w h i c h  m a k e s  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  w a g e  r a t e s  e n d o g ­
e n o u s ,  c o n t i n u e d  r e s e a r c h  w i l l  b e  r e q u i r e d  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  h o u s e h o l d  
d e m a n d  d e t e r m i n a n t s .
A  s e c o n d  a r e a  f o r  f u t u r e  r e s e a r c h  i n v o l v e s  c o n t i n u e d  t e s t s  u p o n  
t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  a t t i t u d i n a l  a n d  e c o n o m ic  d e t e r m i n a n t s .  T h e  
s i g n i f i c a n t  im p r o v e m e n t  i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  e c o n o m ic  m o d e ls  p l u s  t h e  c o r r e ­
s p o n d i n g  d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  e c o n o m ic  v a r i a b l e s  i m p o r t a n c e  s h o u l d  e n c o u r a g e  
f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h  a l o n g  t h i s  l i n e .
F i n a l l y ,  a  r e c u r r i n g  t h e m e  i n  t h e  e c o n o m ic  l i t e r a t u r e  e m p h a s iz e s  
t h e  d i v e r s i t y  o f  o p i n i o n  a m o n g  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  r e s e a r c h e r s .  I n  m a n y  
i n s t a n c e s  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  i n  w h i c h  t h e  d e b a t e  t a k e s  p l a c e  e x u d e s  a n  
" e i t h e r  y o u ' r e  w i t h  m e o r  a g a i n s t  m e "  a t t i t u d e ,  o r ,  m o r e  s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  
t h e  o p p o s in g  v i e w s  a r e  a s s u m e d  t o  b e  m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e .  T h e  s u p p o r t  
f o r  m a n y  o f  t h e  v i e w s  f o u n d  h e r e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  o p p o s i n g  t h e o r i e s  
h a v e  t h e i r  o w n  u n i q u e  s t r e n g t h s  a n d  w e a k n e s s e s  t h a t  d e m a n d s  a  s y n t h e s i s  
o f  c o m p e t in g  t h e o r i e s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  b e s t  c o m p o n e n ts  o f  e a c h  a r e  t a k e n  a s
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c o m p le m e n t s .  P e r h a p s  D a v i d  H um e s u m m a r iz e d  t h i s  c o n f l i c t  t h e  b e s t  b y  
o b s e r v i n g  t h a t ,  " . . .  t h e r e  i s  a  t r u t h  a n d  f a l s e h o o d  i n  a l l  p r o p o s i ­
t i o n s  . . . ,  a n d  a  t r u t h  a n d  f a l s e h o o d  w h i c h  l i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  c o m p a s s  o f  
h u m a n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g . "
A P P E N D IX  A
I .  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
C u r r e n t  d e b a t e  o v e r  t h e  e a r l y  m a t h e m a t i c a l  m o d e l ' s  a s s u m p t i o n  
t h a t  w o r k  c a r r i e s  n o  u t i l i t y  ( o r  d i s u t i l i t y ) ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h o s e  a r g u ­
m e n ts  i n  f a v o r  o f  i n c l u d i n g  w o r k  a s  a  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  u t i l i t y  b y  t h e  
c o n t r i b u t o r s  t o  t h e  s y m p o s iu m  o n  L i n d n e r ' s  H a r r i e d  L e i s u r e  C l a s s ,  
p r o m p t s  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  m o d e l  d e v e l o p e d  h e r e  t o  i n c l u d e  h o u r s  w o r k e d  
i n  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  T w o  a d d i t i o n a l  c h a n g e s  i n c l u d e  a  s p o u s e  e f f e c t  
i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  v a l u e  o f  t i m e  i n  o r d e r  t o  e x p l i c i t l y  c o n s i d e r  t h i s  i n t e r ­
d e p e n d e n c y ,  a n d  f o r m a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  t i m e  r e s o u r c e  c o n s t r a i n t  b y  p r e ­
s e r v i n g  i t s  s e p a r a b i l i t y .  B o t h  c h a n g e s  m a k e  t h e  a n a l y s i s  m o r e  c o m p l e x ,  
b u t  o f f s e t  t h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e  b y  i l l u s t r a t i n g  t h e  e x a c t  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e t w e e n  t h e  h o u s e h o ld  d e m a n d  c o m p o n e n ts  i n  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l .
I n  S e c t i o n  I I  t h e  b a s i c  m o d e l  w i t h  a l l  s t a t e d  c h a n g e s  i s  
f o r m a l i z e d  a n d  s o l v e d  f o r  i t s  f i r s t  a n d  s e c o n d  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s .  I n  
S e c t i o n  I I I  t h e  r e s u l t s  a r e  i n t e r p r e t e d ,  a n d  S e c t i o n  I V  s u m m a r iz e s  t h e  
r e s u l t s .
I I .  T h e  B a s i c  M o d e l  
A l t e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  a n d  t h e  d e s i r e d  c o n s t r a i n t s  
a r e  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  t h e  m o d e l  d e t a i l e d  b e l o w :
U =  U ( X ,  Z ,  L ,  S ,  N ,  HW ) ( A . l )
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a n d  m a x i m iz e d  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o n s t r a i n t s :
H W -V ^  +  H W S - v |  +  Y  +  y S ( S )  =  P % 'X  +  [ P g - P g t V ^ . S j l ' Z
+  P ^ C V ^ ,  P g ;  N )  +  L 'V ?
+ L ^ ( S ) - V ^ ( S )  ( A . 2 )
T g  =  2 4  =  HW +  L  +  ( A .  3 )
w h e r e  a l l  o f  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  d e f i n e d  a s  b e f o r e .  O n c e  a g a i n ,  t h e  m a j o r  
c h a n g e s  a r e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  HW i n  e q u a t i o n  ( A . l ) ,  a n  e x t r a  c o n s t r a i n t —  
e q u a t i o n  ( A . 3 ) ,  a n d  a d d i n g  t h e  s p o u s e 's  e f f e c t  u p o n  t i m e  v a l u a t i o n .  A l l  
v a l u e s  r e f e r  t o  t h e  w i f e  e x c e p t  t h o s e  w i t h  t h e  s u p e r s c r i p t  S .
A d d in g  S i n  t h e  l i s t  o f  d e t e r m i n a n t s  i m p a c t s  t h e  s y s t e m  b y  
d i r e c t l y  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  h u s b a n d 's  e f f e c t  u p o n  h i s  w i f e ' s  t i m e  v a l u e ,  
a n d  i n d i r e c t l y  b y  a f f e c t i n g  a l l  c r o s s - p r i c e  e f f e c t s  t h r o u g h  t h e  t i m e  
v a l u e  m e a s u r e .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  S o n l y  i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  d e m a n d  
f u n c t i o n s  t h r o u g h  o n e  c r o s s - p r i c e  m e a s u r e ,  V A L ^ , i n  C h a p t e r  I I ,  a n d  
t h i s  e f f e c t  w a s  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  s p o u s e s  c o m p e t i t i o n  f o r  t h e  h o m e  p r o d u c e d  
g o o d .  W i t h i n  t h i s  f r a m e w o r k ,  t h e  h u s b a n d  e x e r t s  a  m o r e  d i r e c t  i n f l u e n c e  
u p o n  f a m i l y  s i z e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  h o u r s  w o r k e d ,  e t c .  b y  a l t e r i n g  t h e  
w o m a n 's  t i m e  v a l u e .  A s  b e f o r e ,  t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  c r o s s ­
p r i c e  m e a s u r e s  p l u s  t h e  in c o m e  e f f e c t  w i l l  s h e d  s o m e  l i g h t  o n  t h e  u t i l ­
i t y  i n d e p e n d e n c e  a s s u m p t i o n .
T o  m a x i m iz e  t h e  u t i l i t y  l e v e l  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  s p e c i f i e d  c o n ­
s t r a i n t s ,  e q u a t i o n  ( A . 4 )  s e t s  u p  t h e  L a g r a n g i a n  f u n c t i o n  a s :
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L = U(X,Z,L,S,N,HW) - Xi{HW*V^(HW,S,WR) + HW^(S)*V^(S)
+ Y + Y^(S) - P^-X - [P^+P^(V^(HW,WR,S),S)]-Z
- P^[V^(HW,WR,S);N] - L-V^(HW,WR,S) - L^(S)-V^(S)}
- X2 (Tq-HW-L-T^-Tj^) (A. 4)
and then taking the partial derivative of equation (A.4) with respect 
to X, Z , L, S, N, HW, and setting the results equal to zero gives;
9£r/3X — ~ ^ (A*5)
3L/9Z = Ü2 - Xi{Pz + Pz [Vt (HW,WR,S),S]} = 0 (A.6)
8L/9L = - X^-V^(HW,WR,S) - Xg = 0 (A.7)
s s s s
36/as = Ug + Xj{[HW*(3Vt /3S) + V-j* (3HW /3S) + HW (3V?/3S)
- [(3P2/3S) - (3P2/3V^)(3V^/3S)]-Z + V^(3L^/3S)
- L^-(3v|/3S) - L-(3V^/3S)} = 0 (A.8)
36/3N = Uj^  - X^(3Pjj/9N) = 0 (A.9)
9L/9HW = Ujjw + X j [Vt (HW,WR,S) + HW* (9Vt /9HW)
- (3Pz /9Vj )(3Vj /9HW) Z - OPj^/gv^) Ov^/aHW)
- L(9V^/3HW)] - Xg = 0 (A.10)
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9L/3Xi = HW-V^(HW,WR,S) + HW^(S)-V^(S) + Y + Y^(S) - P%'X
- {Pg + P2[V^(HW,WR,S),S]}-Z - Pj^[V^(HW,WR,S),S]
- L*V^(HW,WR,S) - L^(S)-V^(S) = 0 (A.11)
3 6 / 3 X 2  =  T q  -  HW -  L -  T z  -  =  0  ( A . 1 2 )
S e t t i n g  P j j  =  1  a s  t h e  n u m e r a i r e  y i e l d s  e q u a t i o n  ( A .  1 3 ) :
U j j y / U j j  =  -V ^ C H W .W R .S )  +  ( 3 V ^ /3 H W )* H W  -  ( B P g /S H N ^ 'Z
-  O P j ^ / 3 V ^ )  ( 3 V ^ /3 H W )  -  ( 3 V ^ / 3 H W ) * L  +  ( A . 1 3 )
w h i c h  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  m a r g i n a l  r a t e  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  c o m p o s i t e  
g o o d  a n d  h o u r s  w o r k e d  e q u a l s  t h e  s h a d o w  p r i c e  o f  t i m e ,  ^ 2 » m in u s  t h e  
m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y  o f  m o n e y ,  , m u l t i p l i e d  b y  t h e  t e r m  i n  b r a c k e t s .  I n ­
s t e a d  o f  r e i t e r a t i n g  t h e  o t h e r  m a r g i n a l  s u b s t i t u t i o n  c o n d i t i o n s ,  t h e i r  
s i m i l a r i t y  w i t h  e q u a t i o n s  ( 2 . 1 0 ) - ( 2 . 1 5 )  i s  n o t e d  a n d  t h e  a n a l y s i s  p r o ­
c e e d s  t o  t h e  s e c o n d  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s .
A p p l y i n g  C r a m e r ' s  r u l e  t o  t h e  b o r d e r e d  H e s s i a n  m a t r i x  i n  T a b l e  
A . l  y i e l d s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t o t a l  d i f f e r e n t i a l s :
d N /d W R  =  { X i [ ( 3 P 2 / 3 V ^ ) ( 3 V ^ / 3 W R ) - D ^ 5  +  ( 3 V ^ /3 W R )
- Ag-D^5 +  (32p^/3N3V^)(3V^/3WR)-Dgg - A^^-Dgg]
+  A ^ g ' D y g l / D  ( A . 1 4 )
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dHW/dWR = {XiI(3P2/3V-j;.)(aVT/3WR)*D2g + (3V^/3WR)-Dgg
- Ag-D^G + (3=PN/aPN3VT)(3VT/3W*)'Dsg - Aii'Dgg]
+ Ai2'D,g}/D (A.15)
dS/dWR = {Xi[(3Pz/3Vp)(3V /aWRj'Dg^ + (av^/awRj'Dg^
- Ag'D^^ + (32p^/3N3V^)(3V^/3WR)-Ds^ - Aj^-Dgi^]
+ Ai2'Dy^}/D (A.16)
w h e r e  e q u a t i o n s  ( A . 1 4 ) - ( A . 1 6 )  a p p r o x i m a t e  t h e  t o t a l  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  i n  
e q u a t i o n s  ( 2 . 1 7 ) - ( 2 . 1 9 )  i n  i n c l u d i n g  o w n  a n d  c r o s s - p r i c e  p l u s  a  S l u t s k y  
in c o m e  e f f e c t ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  e x a c t  c o m p o s i t i o n  d i f f e r s .
D i s t i n c t  f r o m  e q u a t i o n s  ( 2 , 1 7 ) - ( 2 . 1 9 )  a n d  i m p o r t a n t  t o  u s  i s  t h e  
o b s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n  e q u a t i o n  ( A . 1 5 )  d o e s  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  i m p l y  a  r e d u c t i o n  i n  h o u r s  w o r k e d  w i t h  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  w a g e  
in c o m e  u n l e s s  t h e  sum  o f  t h e  e l e m e n t s  i n  e q u a t i o n  ( A . 1 5 )  a r e  p o s i t i v e .
I f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  d H W /dW  e x c e e d s  z e r o  t h e  w o r k e r  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  a  " d e p r e s ­
s i v e "  i n  P h e l p ' s  t e r m i n o l o g y ,  o r  o n e  w h o  l i v e s  t o  w o r k  i n s t e a d  o f  t h e  
c o m m o n ly  a s s u m e d  w o r k  t o  l i v e  t h e o r y .  T h e  i n h e r e n t  a d v a n t a g e  t o  t h i s  
a p p r o a c h  f o l l o w s  f r o m  i t s  g r e a t e r  g e n e r a l i t y  r e l a t i v e  t o  l e s s  f l e x i b l e  
t e c h n i q u e s  u s u a l l y  u s e d  t o  s t u d y  l a b o r  f o r c e  a c t i v i t y .
A l t h o u g h  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  e v e r y  t o t a l  d i f f e r e n t i a l  p r o v i d e s  u n i q u e  
i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  h o u s e h o l d  d e m a n d  a n d  f a m i l y  f o r m a t i o n ,  
a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  a p p r o a c h  r e q u i r i n g  l e s s  s p a c e  i s  a n a l y s i s  o f  c h a n g e s  i n  
t h e  s p o u s e s  t i m e  v a l u e  a n d  l a b o r  f o r c e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  u p o n  t h e  l a b o r
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f o r c e  a c t i v i t y  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  u n d e r  s t u d y .  T h e  t o t a l  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  m o v e m e n ts  i n  t h e  s p o u s e s  w o r k  h a b i t s  a n d  t i m e  v a l u e  a r e  
s p e c i f i e d  i n  e q u a t i o n s  ( A . 1 7 )  a n d  ( A . 1 8 ) ,  r e s p e c t f u l l y ,  a s :
d H W /d H W ^  =  - ( V ^ / S ) - A i - D ^ 7 +  D g y / D  ( A . 1 7 )
d H W /d V ®  =  - A g ' X ^ ' D ^ y  +  D g y /D  ( A . 1 8 )
I n  b o t h  i n s t a n c e s  t h e  c h a n g e  i n  l a b o r  f o r c e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i s  t h e  sum  o f  
t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t  a n d  S l u t s k y  in c o m e  e f f e c t .  T h e  e x a c t  m o v e m e n t  
i n  h o u r s  w o r k e d  d e p e n d s  u p o n  t h e  r e l a t i v e  s i g n  a n d  m a g n i t u d e  o f  t h e  tw o  
e f f e c t s .  T h e  d i v e r s i t y  a m o n g  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  s t u d i e s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  a p p r o a c h  d e v e l o p e d  h e r e  p a r t i a l l y  a c c o u n t s  f o r  t h e  c o n ­
f l i c t i n g  c o n c l u s i o n s .
T h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n c l u s i o n s  i n  A p p e n d i x  A  s u p p o r t  t h o s e  o f  t h e  
m o d e l  d e v e l o p e d  i n  C h a p t e r  I I  w i t h i n  a  s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  f r a m e w o r k .
T h e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  m o d e l  i s  i t s  d e m o n s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  f a i l i n g  
i n  c u r r e n t  r e s e a r c h  t o  c o n s i d e r  u t i l i t y  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  a n d  t r a n s f o r m s  
t h e  b a s i c  m o d e l  i n t o  a  f o r m  m o r e  s u i t a b l e  f o r  e m p i r i c a l  t e s t i n g .
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